Industrial Control Security-through SCADA removal (switch water pumps \ send arbitrary commands \ Intranet topology \ video monitoring \ a large number of sensitive data leaks)
Never give up !!!!
Let the lightning flash blind me, this service page must be accessed using IE8.
Http: // **. **/bugs/wooyun-2010-0144999 sometimes the heart is so cold and cold
Search for the company http ://**.**.**.**/
Use SCADA keywords and smart water in the network space to collect the program about some cases
The account password is as follows!
Attackers like this can kill admin 666666.
This is a killer !!
I almost forgot about the mobile version...
**. **: 8080/admin666666
**. **: 82/admin666666
**. **: 8086/admin 666666
Pump off
This should make you break water and keep water?
Hikvision shot again. Hahaha
**. **: 88/login.html admin 666666
So many, even more... so how does admin 666666 come from? In addition to the official default password, what else does it have?
Topology
**. **: 82/admin 666666
**. **: 82/admin 666666
**. **: 82/admin 666666
**. **: 82/admin666666
**. **: 82/admin666666
**. **: 8000/admin666666
**. **: 82/admin 666666
**. **: 88/admin 666666
**. **: 82/admin 666666
The following things are the same, and it does not prove that all commands can be sent (although I have not tried, do not die). A large amount of sensitive data leaks
Do not dare to send, after all, Industrial Control
Start or close the pump? Struggling
**. **: 8080/admin666666
**. **: 82/admin666666
**. **: 8086/admin 666666
**. **: 88/login.html admin 666666
**. **: 82/admin 666666
**. **: 82/admin 666666
**. **: 82/admin 666666
**. **: 82/admin666666
**. **: 82/admin666666
**. **: 8000/admin666666
**. **: 82/admin 666666
**. **: 88/admin 666666
**. **: 82/admin 666666
Solution:
Modify the password.