Simultaneous tactics (Game Theory tricks)

The game is actually a strategic act of interaction. In every confrontation of interests, people are seeking for a winning strategy. The essence of the game lies in the mutual influence and dependency of the participants' strategies. This interaction is embodied in two ways.

 

The first interaction mode occurs simultaneously. For example, in the prisoner's dilemma story, the participants make moves at the same time, and they have no idea which step others will take. However, everyone must be aware that there are other players in the game, and these players are also very clear about this. Therefore, everyone must imagine what they will do if they are in another person's position, so as to predict the results of this step. The best strategy he chooses is also an integral part of this full disk consideration. Regardless of the strategy adopted by the other party, they should adopt their own optimal strategy. This is the topic of game theory research. To understand this, let's look at a news war case.

 

Every week, two American magazines, "times" and "newsweekly", secretly compete to make the most striking cover story. A dramatic or interesting cover can attract the eyes of potential buyers standing in front of the newsstand. Therefore, the editors of times will hold meetings every week to find the next cover.

 

When they did this, they knew that at this time, the editors of newsweekly were also holding a meeting to discuss the next cover story. In turn, the editors of News Weekly also know that the editors of times are doing the same thing. Editors of the Times also know that news weekly editors know this.

 

The two news magazines entered into a strategic game. Because times and News Weekly are both at the same time, the two sides have to take action without knowing what their opponents decide. It will be too late to wait until they discover what the other party has done. Of course, the losers of this week may try their best to fight back next week. However, at that time, there may have been a completely different new story model and a completely different game.

 

Let us assume there are two major news this week: first, Congress is making a quarrel over the budget, and second, it has released a new drug that is said to have a special effect on AIDS.

 

When editors choose a cover story, they first consider which news is more attractive to buyers before the newsstand. Among the buyers before the newsstand. Suppose 30% of people are interested in budget issues, and 70% are interested in new AIDS drugs. These people only pay for magazines when the news they are interested in turns into cover stories. If the two magazines use the same news for cover stories, then interested buyers will be divided into two groups, one for "times" and the other for "newsweekly".

 

Now, the editor of the times can make the following reasoning: If newsweekly uses a new AIDS drug as its cover story, if I use a budget question, I will get the entire 'budget problem market' (30% of all readers). If I use a new AIDS drug, the two of us will share the 'potential disease new drug market '(that is, I get 35% of all readers), so the income of new AIDS drugs will exceed the budget. If newsweekly uses budget questions, I will get 15% readers if I use the same story. If I use a new AIDS drug, I will get 70% readers. This time, the second solution will also bring me more income. Therefore, I have an advantage strategy that uses new AIDS drugs as the cover. No matter which of the above two news items my opponent chooses, this option will be better than the budget issue.

 

Such policy considerations are also effective for newsweekly. The selection of new AIDS drugs is their common advantage strategy.

 

When each participant has an advantage policy, it is logical to balance the advantage policy. Unfortunately, in most games,Balanced advantage strategyIt does not exist.

 

Sometimes, a participant has an advantage strategy, while other participants do not. You only need to slightly modify the above cover story war example to understand this situation.

 

Let us assume that all readers prefer to select the times. If two magazines choose the same news as the cover story, 60% of potential buyers of the news choose times, and 40% choose newsweekly.

 

For the Times, New AIDS drugs are still dominant strategies, but for newsweeks, they are no longer. If newsweekly also makes the same choice, only 28% of readers can be obtained, which is less than 30% of the selected budget. That is to say, the best choice of News Weekly is no longer related to the strategy of the times. If "times" chooses a new AIDS drug, "News Weekly" chooses a budget issue to get better sales. For "News Weekly", the market for budget problems is always larger than that for new medicines.

 

The editors of newsweekly do not know what the times will choose. However, they can analyze that there is an advantage strategy in the Times, which must be their choice. Therefore, they can confidently assume that the times has chosen a new drug for AIDS and therefore choose their best strategy, namely, budget.

 

It can be seen that in games without the balance of traditional strategies, we can still find a balance based on the logic of the advantage strategy. As long as one party has an advantage strategy, it will adopt its advantage strategy, and the other party will adopt its best strategy for this strategy.