Asked Huawei Cloud Reengineering: Billions of goals test management mechanism

Chuhuihui Shenzhen reported a sudden deceleration may come sooner than expected.　　Just after the first quarter of 2011, Huawei is beginning to face a big test of "negative growth" in its performance: The company's first-quarter psst (research and solutions) operator sales fell 1% per cent year-on-year, order growth was only 1%, and revenue was significantly lower than expected, according to an email issued by Huawei recently to various departments. "All the systems have used up all the fees that have been awarded, directly resulting in our cost rate reaching a record high of 40%." "The message reminds employees:" From the first to the agency is still immersed in the 2010 Harvest Joy (Income growth 24.2%, profit growth 12.8%) ... But the first-quarter operating data brought us back to the grim reality from a jubilant and joyous dance. More than 100 years ago, the Titanic was also set sail in cheers. At the same time, Huawei issued a possible "full pay cut" warning: The PSST system this year to order the growth target of 10%, the annual target growth of 13%, the annual income growth of 10%, "if the first half of the target is not reached, more than the second level of managers at less than the percentage of wages;　　, the pay cut extended to three or more supervisors, the end of the year to achieve the target, the system within the scope of all staff pay. Coincidentally。 The recent earnings from Huawei's rival ZTE show signs of slowing: While 13.8% of revenue growth was achieved in the first quarter and 15.86% per cent of profit growth, the growth was largely rooted in the contribution of terminals such as mobile phones (up 51.04%),　　Its network of operators, which psst revenues from Huawei, also grew only 1.57%, while software systems, services and other products fell by 0.26% per cent year-on-year. The telecoms equipment industry, built around operators, is facing the industry's "bottoming out": In the global market scale of about 120 billion dollars a year, in 2010, Huawei has done 24 billion U.S. dollars (excluding terminal income), ZTE achieved 10 billion U.S. dollars, coupled with Ericsson, NSN, rung of the partition, in the cake increment unchanged, They will face an "incremental" deadline for competition, which can be difficult to mutate.　　Over the past decade, the two Chinese equipment makers have been born with the potential to seep and embezzle rival sites, and have expelled rivals (Siemens, Nortel, etc.) from the Global Club. What does this mean for Huawei, which has been in the "running" position for more than 20 years since the start of the business? The transition to the "cloud" strategy, from the telecommunications "cloud" to the nuggets of the Internet "cloud" is an immediate road?　　Can the transition work quickly with a 110,000-employee volume?　　All sorts of inquiries, must haunt Huawei's next 10 years. At the end of the fast lane Huawei CMO Yu: "The operator market, to do 30 billion dollars has been basically the end" in early 2011, the U.S. market to the Huawei poured the last pot of cold water: After a long period of hard work and expectation, the competition for the US operator Spring project was again rejected by the U.S. Department of Commerce under direct intervention, for reasons such as "security".　　Prior to this, Huawei has been defeated by Verizon, At&t and other projects for the same reason, and the three major U.S. operations have been closed to Huawei.　　This has put an end to Huawei's fantasies about the US market in systems and equipment, and has also ended expectations that it can still sustain rapid growth in traditional devices. In fact, more than 20 years ago, starting from China, followed by the Chinese market, the Asia-Pacific market, Africa, Europe and other markets, Huawei, with the help of the global 2g-3g technology, quickly completed the international enclosure and beyond, defeated Siemens, Alcatel and other hundred years old shop. In particular, in 2006-2007, Huawei successfully shot into the second place in the world with a "running" posture of annual sales growth of 29% and an annual increase in operating profit by 57%.　　By 2010, Huawei's report card had been so beautiful that its overseas earnings rose by 33.8%, compared with a 9.7% per cent domestic income. But this growing myth may be facing a stage of low ebb. The first is the depletion of the incremental market, which is doomed to the traditional telecoms market for attacking players like Huawei, there seems to be no "big battle", the global 3G construction peak has been over, LTE, such as 4 G network is still groping and testing stage, the operators to enter a large-scale stage trough; second, under the premise of the increment reduction, the industry competition intensifies, including　　Intellectual property lawsuits in the telecom industry, including the "China" war, have intensified to some extent, the remaining few competitors have begun to move from strategic "offensive" to strategic "defensive", which means that the industry's internal friction increases, cost competition intensifies, not ruled out a new round of price killing. In fact, Huawei has frankly seen the industry's predicament: "The operator market, to do 30 billion dollars has been basically the end."　　"Huawei CMO Yu told reporters that the traditional equipment market will still have room to rise," but Huawei in the telecommunications equipment market has done a second, the cake space has been relatively limited. The other two roads assume that Huawei will achieve the "billions" of targets in 5 years, enterprise networks and terminals to contribute at least 30% April 27, 2011, Shanghai, Yu, a global telecoms analyst, said: "Huawei's analyst conference has been open for 7 years, and this year we send the first message that we want to expand the border from CT (communication technology　　) to ICT (information and communication technology).　　The "transformational" signal that Huawei has loudly conveyed to the outside world points to two new ways for Huawei: The corporate web market, and the digital terminal market represented by mobile phones. There is no denying that this is a two-way road full of temptations. Compared with the global market of 120 billion dollars a year in traditional telecom equipment, the imagination of enterprise net and terminal market "trillion" is hard to resist. Take the enterprise network market as an example, the storage market, server market, respectively, added 60 billion U.S.Dollar and 40 billion dollar market size.　　The mobile phone market is more attractive, conservative estimates of the annual size of 300 billion U.S. dollars, with the future smartphone, tablet and other smart Terminal market expansion, this figure will also be a geometric growth.　　How big is the space that belongs to Huawei?　　In 2010 years, public figures show that the market size of Huawei's terminal is currently 4 billion-4.5 billion U.S. dollars, and Huawei insiders estimate that the company's net product revenue is currently about 1 billion dollars. How long is the gap between dream and reality?　　Let's say that Huawei's example for the next 20 years is data giant Cisco and Samsung, the Asian electronics consumer giant, which now has a gap of $40 billion trillion in Cisco's fiscal year 2010 and Samsung about $110 billion trillion.　　Huawei's internal corporate network and the end of the goal is set: 3-year corporate network to 10 billion U.S. dollars, 5-year terminal to 20 billion U.S. dollars-that is, if Huawei to 5 years to achieve the "billions" of targets, the enterprise network and terminals will at least bring them more than 30% earnings, or more. It's not easy. First of all, in the enterprise network market, the future to face the number of enterprise customers is far greater than the operator market (global quality operator customers for 50, and the world's best corporate customers at least at the "million" level, and secondly, it spending a larger industry, in addition to the telecommunications industry, as well as finance, government, education, medical, etc.　　The demand varies from sector to industry, and in addition to the cloud penetration of the Internet from telecoms clouds, the more powerful it giants such as Cisco, IBM and Hewlett-Packard have dominated.　　In the terminal area, in addition to the face of Nokia, beyond the competition of Apple and Samsung, it is more important that Huawei will have to face the change of operation mode first, because Huawei has been born to the business of business-to-business, and the terminal industry, a greater opportunity in the field of business, from the operator customization to brand, channel, Huawei do?　　The temptation to slow down: DNA test for years of high growth, high dividends, so that the crisis, shared risk awareness is greatly weakened and those such as sales revenue, growth expectations, such as simple digital dream, compared to Huawei's more serious challenge may be about its DNA, which involves a series of cultural, institutional issues. May 12, in the letter on the Psst performance "negative" warning of the message issued, Huawei employees inside sparked a "pay cut" the fierce debate.　　According to news, Huawei employees based on the 2010-year performance of the year-end bonuses have been postponed, while the expected salary in the year above the 15 level of staff will be postponed, and more than 18 of the leadership share dividend will be postponed. Huawei's employee position levels ranged from 12 to 22 levels. This means that the real disposable cash receipts for most of Huawei's employees will fall sharply this year, especially among senior-middle-level staff, which has attracted a considerable amount of dissatisfaction. They grumble in various forums and even employees predict that Huawei's cash flow is being challenged, "if the company is not listed, once the enterprise ceases to grow, the staff will appear high turnover rate, the old staff will be set to leave. Historically, this is just another use of the management strategy of Huawei's "struggling people" culture. This strategy includes two levels: one is the award, the full stock ownership plan, to allow employees to fully share the growth dividend of the enterprise, so far, more than 60,000 of Huawei's 110,000 people hold the company's shares, another level is the penalty, from the middle of the 90 's mid-century to the beginning of the "It bubble", Huawei many times in the industry downturn and the company encountered challenges　　, the use of "collective resignation, to accept the company's competition and selection" and "collective pay" and other means to the staff to convey the company's crisis consciousness vertically.　　It is this culture based on the struggle that created today's Huawei. But the culture is being questioned and puzzled by a considerable number of employees within the company. Huawei insiders analysis, Huawei currently 110,000 people, at least more than 50,000 of employees are in 2007 after the party to enter the company, that is, more than half of the staff in Huawei's strongest growth in 2006-2010 years after joining the company. In these five years, Huawei's performance has achieved more than 24% growth each year, the profit is more than 50%, operating activities generated cash flow also increased by more than 49% per annum.　　This ensures that employees receive an extremely high dividend each year, with a dividend of 2.98 yuan per share last year.　　Years of high growth, high dividends, or the positive side of the "struggling" culture-shared company growth has been greatly publicized, and its other aspect-crisis awareness, shared risk is greatly weakened. Perhaps, now is the test of Huawei Culture, the test of Huawei incentives, management mechanisms, if the Huawei startup since the people-oriented incentives ineffective, if the creation of the 20 growth of Huawei must temporarily into mediocrity, her culture is as destructive as in the past? Will her employees, as always, pursue the "billions" of dreams?