Japan's new ocean plan digs China's cape

Japan will be 2020 years ago to its claims of the so-called exclusive economic zone to carry out large-scale exploration of the seabed resources, including large tracts with China's disputed regional text/"Financial national Weekly" in Tokyo Reporter is Liu Hua on the East China Sea issue, May 15, China and Japan foreign ministers openly competing.　　Mr. Okada, Japan's foreign minister, also protested to Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi at a meeting of foreign ministers of China, Japan and South Korea.　　In early May, the Japanese coast Guard said China's maritime surveillance vessels "tracked" the Japanese Ocean survey ship in the East Sea, "the Middle line". Earlier in late April, the Japanese government had developed a new "seabed resources for Energy Assurance Strategy" (hereinafter referred to as the "seabed Strategy"), Japan will be 2020 years ago, the so-called exclusive economic zone of its claim to carry out large-scale exploration of the seabed resources, involving large tracts of disputed areas with China.　　The plan also expands the focus of seabed resources development from oil and gas to other resources such as non-ferrous metals, in an attempt to realize the practical exploitation of seafloor metal minerals as soon as possible. The plan covers a large area of the disputed regional seabed strategy, which is developed by the integrated Ocean Policy Headquarters, under the residence of the Prime Minister of Japan. Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama as "minister", the Cabinet Secretary and the Minister of Marine policy as a "copy minister", members of the department are all cabinet ministers. The agency is specifically responsible for the formulation of relevant policies on ocean affairs and the Coordination of "sea-related" work among provincial offices. The strategy will be considered and promulgated by the Cabinet in June.　　Japan's "cabinet review" rarely rejects the documents submitted by the Prime Minister's official residence, and should therefore be adopted smoothly and become a formal policy. At present, the full text of Japan's seabed strategy has not been officially published. According to Japanese media reports, the plan requires that since the current year in its so-called exclusive economic zone to carry out large-scale exploration of the seabed resources, the scope of its unilateral claim to China's border with the "Middle line", East Ogasawara-gunto, south to Chong Bird Reef, the total exploration area of 340,000 square kilometers. The exploration focuses on "seafloor hydrothermal deposits" and seafloor manganese nodules.　　Among them, 2015 years ago to complete the fishing island Northeast Sea "seafloor hydrothermal ore" exploration, 2020 years ago to complete the exploration of other sea areas, including the Japanese unilaterally advocated by the "middle line" to the Okinawa sea trough between the two disputed areas. The plan also requires that the following work be carried out: first of all, the coordination of the provincial departments, and further promote the exploration of seabed resources, including the acceleration of exploration technology research and development, the seabed Topography Survey, to master the distribution of seabed resources, and secondly, to achieve the 2020 before the "seabed hydrothermal ore" and the seabed Manganese nodules mine practical exploitation, And to do a full prophase exploration.　　Finally, training and supporting a group of related enterprises, to provide financial, policy and other support, strengthen the development of exploration technology, and research and construction of liquefied natural gas offshore production base. The content of the plan was disclosed in the Japanese media caused a great response. Many media in the analysis of this matter, most of the focus on the relationship between China and Japan. Both the news of production and the Daily News agree that a single aspect of exploration in the disputed region of the two countries is bound to leadChina's rebound has intensified the conflict between the two countries over territorial and EEZ issues.　　New concerns of nonferrous metal planning It is noteworthy that nonferrous metals and minerals have become a new concern of the Japanese ocean plan, and that Japan is not simply based on the commercial interests of the seabed non-ferrous metal minerals, but from a strategic perspective of the issue, fully considering the importance of seabed resources for the future development of the country. The "seafloor hydrothermal deposit" mentioned in the plan is a mineral deposit formed by the seawater heated by the magma activity of the Earth's crust, which is rich in gold, copper, zinc and rare earth metals. The seafloor manganese nodule mine is a mineral resource formed by various geological activities of the seabed, which is rich in manganese, copper, cobalt and nickel.　　It is believed that, due to the characteristics of geological activities, in the East China Sea in the Okinawa trough and in many parts of the Pacific, there are a large number of these two types of mineral deposits. Many Japanese media have mentioned that in the future of solar cells, electric vehicles and other new energy, new technology development process, manganese, nickel and rare earth metals will have a very important strategic significance. Japan, as an island country that lacks natural resources, is likely to encounter restrictions in future industrial development if it subjection on key raw materials.　　Therefore, speeding up the development of seabed resources will help ensure the safety of raw materials for the development of the next generation strategic industries in Japan. In fact, in recent years, Japan has continued to increase the investment in seabed resources development, especially the research on seabed resources mining technology, in an attempt to realize the "practical" exploitation of seabed resources.　　Take the just-starting fiscal year 2010 as an example, the budget for the development of mining technology for "seafloor hydrothermal ore" has increased by 20% to 1.2 billion yen (approximately 100 million RMB), and the budget for practical production technology for manganese nodules has reached about 336 million yuan, and has increased in the year. At the same time, the Japanese side also grasp the seabed resources exploration activities, for the future "practical" mining early to ascertain the distribution of minerals.　　In fiscal year 2010, the "three-dimensional geophysical exploration vessel" used for oil and gas prospecting is about 1 billion yuan, and the cost of researching all kinds of mineral exploration technology is as high as 2.7 billion yuan.　　According to the Japanese government's "Integrated Ocean Policy Headquarters" Statistics, the Government of Japan's 2010 ocean business related budget total reached 85 billion yuan, which can be seen its importance to the sea. The Japanese government has vigorously promoted the marine cause, behind the positive demands of Japanese financial. In fact, the launch of the strategy is largely based on the results of the "Integrated Ocean Policy headquarters" in recent years to solicit financial views.　　In January 2010, the "Integrated Ocean Policy headquarters" had conducted a detailed "Ocean development" undertaking survey for "sea-related" groups such as the economic groups such as the group and the Marine Industry Research Institute, and submitted a survey report in March. The report recommended the establishment of a network of floating offshore bases covering essentially the exclusive economic zone of Japan, with the deployment of a floating offshore base in 7 locations within Japan's exclusive economic zone, with helicopters on the base, consisting of a giant floating tank. A network of helicopter landing sites consisting of 7 bases, supplementedThe Outlying islands airport can form an aviation surveillance network covering the exclusive economic zone of Japan. The survey reported that this is not only conducive to rescue, fisheries management and the economic zone of the people's livelihood activities, but also to "deal with unidentified ships" and other tasks.　　This shows the potential military use of the base network.　　In addition, the survey also proposes a variety of options for further strengthening of the bird reef to ensure its claimed "island" status and to deploy an "outlying islands support base" on it. At present, many of the findings are absorbed by the seabed strategy, as evidenced in part of the undersea strategy, which is disclosed by the media.　　However, the more sensitive recommendations on the construction of a floating offshore base network and the reinforcement of the bird reef are also formally included in the seabed strategy, which remains to be clarified before the official publication of the document in June. Speculation on the maritime dispute suspected of political factors in the Japanese side before and after the launch of the seabed strategy, the Japanese government and the media, with the continuous speculation between the two sides of the "contact" at sea, including the Chinese navy in early April with the Japanese self-Defense Forces warships and aircraft "encounter" and the beginning of this article, referred to the Chinese Sea surveillance vessels and Japanese vessels　　"Stalemate." This series of hype, the timing is quite subtle. In fact, the Chinese navy is often subject to close surveillance by Japanese warships and aircraft when performing ocean-going training, and the "interaction" between the two is not uncommon; on the other hand, it is not the first time that China's maritime watchdog has carried out a normal cruise mission in the waters claimed by the Chinese side, or has In December 2008, China Sea surveillance ship also carried out cruise law enforcement activities in the waters of the Diaoyu Islands.　　By contrast, there is nothing special about the vessel's contact at sea. But after these two incidents, the Japanese authorities-Japan's Defense Ministry and Japan's maritime security office-have "provoked", actively released news, published pictures, and then "triggered" media hype, and then the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with repeatedly "protest" artificially to the matter seriously.　　The motives of the Japanese side for doing so deserve attention. It should be said that the issues of territorial and maritime rights and interests have always been sensitive issues of Sino-Japanese relations. How to deal with sensitive issues in the context of the overall "fair" situation in China and Japan in recent years?　　According to the "Financial national weekly" reporter understand that even within the Japanese government, different departments, different people have different understanding of this. Earlier, the Japanese side of the Chinese people worried, in the Hatoyama cabinet support rate is depressed, there may be two negative aspects of Japan's relationship with China: one, the Hatoyama cabinet may choose to show a tough stance on some one or two sensitive issues, in order to boost support and deflect pressure on issues such as the Futenma base.　　Hatoyama's cabinet in the "bureaucracy" and other aspects of the reform of the Japanese political and bureaucratic groups within the strong rebound, some opposition to Mr Hatoyama may use the sensitive issues in Sino-Japanese relations "gossip", and further increase the pressure on Mr Hatoyama's cabinet in the diplomatic field. In general, it is the established policy of the Japanese Government to actively strive for maritime rights and interests, and Japan's specific affairs departmentThe door has also been solidly advancing the relevant plan. But the timing of the big decisions and how to get and use public support will undoubtedly require decision makers. It is foreseeable that, in the context of their own interests, Japan will continue to make a move on the ocean policy, even with a lot of irritating tricks.