What is science?

1.1 In the past it was thought that science is a knowledge derived from empirical facts, and that the facts based on observation and experimentation are empirical facts. empiricism; logical positivism//

1.2 However, observation and experimentation require a format picture of knowledge, and the observation of the facts (most of the cases) is not provided to the observer through the senses. It is not possible to determine facts and derive knowledge from them first. Observe infiltration theory//

1.3 This paradox exists, but it cannot be denied that scientific knowledge should not be seen as proof of the facts. A typical chicken or egg first, there is the first observation or knowledge. //

1.4 If the observation of the true and false of a proposition can be determined by a direct way of observation, no matter how the observation proposition is described, the observed proposition proved in this way lays the factual foundation for scientific knowledge.

1.5 Such a way exists? (Copernicus ' theory in the Copernican Revolution does not conform to the observation, until the Galileo's improved telescope, which is convinced of Copernicus's theory, makes the observation of facts conform to theory)//The discussion below is all about solving this problem and finding a "pervasive" approach. //

2.1 Observation is passive and personal or active and public? You see a flower falling for its gorgeous color: a white flower blooms in a group of red flowers, even if you want to observe the safflower white flower also entered your sight, it is passive, you think it beautiful others think it is not beautiful it is a human nature; a white flower you see only the whole beauty of whiteness, It wasn't until you invented the microscope that you knew why it was white, it was active, and you were seen by others that its cells appreciate the beauty of its composition, which is public. But quantum mechanics has yet to see a problem. //

2.2 Scientific observation requires the minimization of personal nature, that is, the scientific requirements of observation is active and public.

2.3 For this reason, the observation of factual requirements is objective, but it is also wrong. It is natural for people to make the following requirements for scientific observation: to actively upgrade observation technology, and actively improve the observation process, it is natural to lead to the Division of Science and Humanities, to a certain extent, this is the scientific "original sin", the scientific development of the inherent requirement is constantly updated observation means and procedures. //

The 3.1 experiments emerged as a related, repeatable, controlled and constantly improved observation tool.

3.2 If the experiment is infallible and modifiable, the science based on it is also infallible and modifiable, but in order to judge the appropriateness of the experiment it is necessary to resort to theory. How does this cycle break? (Back to our Junior high school experiment, measuring the current of the coil deflection angle and current by using the ammeter to measure the currents generated by the magnetic inductance line, this experiment itself is a cycle.) Of course this does not usually happen in real science, and we have to make sure that the theory we use is different from the theory we are going to be validating. ）

3.3 Some have pointed to the maze: The result of the experiment is decided by the role of the world, not by the theory of the world. It is possible to refer to the world test theory, and this meaningful result is not always easy to obtain and to be infallible.

4.1 The function of logic is to maintain the truth value//To be understood as a transitivity//, but not to provide new knowledge.

4.2 Thus the science is inductive//mathematics is deductive//.

4.3 The effective induction should be large enough to be repeated under the same conditions and in different scenarios, and any accepted observation proposition should not contradict the deduced law. (If a large amount of a is observed in many different scenarios, and the observed a has a property B, then all a has a property of B.) The question is how big is big enough, what situation is different scenario .... ）

4.4 For this reason, the inductivism faces several dilemmas: on the Unknown world, how to confirm knowledge through inductive reasoning, and how the inaccuracy of inductive premises matches the exact theory of mathematical deduction; inductive problem (revised into " If a large amount of a is observed in many different scenarios, and the observed a is of a nature B, then all a may have a property B "problem will not be solved, it is still a universal proposition." We seem to be able to use a limit to understand, the number of effective success/Total, the total is the trend of infinity, the limit is 0, then the law is true probability tends to 0. ）

4.5 This scientific model can be understood as: Theory and Law--initial conditions--anticipating and interpreting//because the pattern of human habitual psychology is particularly easy to understand and conforms to the natural evolution//The scientific objectivity of the interpretation is derived from the observation of induction and deduction as an objective degree.

5.1 Because of the dilemma of the inductive and positivism, Popper and the Viennese School have parted ways to put forward the falsificationism//(or translation as falsification//), and the doctrine admits that observation is guided by theory and based on theory, and the theory is speculative or temporary, Science is always through trial and error conjecture and retort forward, and induction does not matter.

5.2 The fallacy of the universal proposition can be introduced from the proposition of proper statement. Commonly known as a counter case, Einstein said that if the theory of relativity is wrong, as long as one person to prove enough. //

5.3 For the undocumented, the scientific criterion is verifiable: there is a logical set of possible observation propositions and theoretical inconsistencies. That is not the full statement of the various possibilities universal statement, not ambiguous ambiguity of the proposition, can not be a circular argument or tautology. (Certain historical assertions and religions of Marxism are not science.) Of course, science is not tall, from a cultural point of view, religious culture, art and culture and science and technology culture should not be graded. In fact, this is feyerabend to prove that society should not give science too lofty status. The more potential potential (Falsifier) The theory can do more to predict better (the potential of Kepler theory is a subset of the potential of Newton's theory of gravitation, no evidence of Newton's theory more opportunities, so Newton's theory is better.) The highly verifiable theory has not been proven to be more popular. (whether the proponents should be highly imaginative and adventurous) is quite different from cautious generalizations, even though some people think that scientific progress can be made through bold assumptions and then mercilessly. ）

5.4 There is also a corollary to the theory that a high degree of corroboration means that the statement must be highly clear and precise (it is clear that the clearer the number of potential certificates there are, the more they will say that the speed of light in the air is a better statement of 2.998E8 meters per second than 3E8 meters per second).

5.5 Thus, no one will form a view of scientific progress: the scope of theory can be explained more and more, there are more and more theoretical potential. The development of science is the process of criticizing and judging them from problems to the introduction of new problems (meaning that science begins with observation rather than problems).

6.1 The former said: a hypothesis should be able to testify the better, but has not been proven. Hence the refinement of the undocumented: a hypothesis should be more proof than the hypothesis it replaces. This means that the focus of their attention shifts from the absolute value of a single theory to the relative value of competition theory, and they provide not a static description but a dynamic description. (relative to the degree of proof rather than absolute admissibility.) ）

6.2 But theory always encounters something different from observation, when we revise the theory, there are two situations: ad hoc (ad hoc), which does not result in a new test that is not modified to test the modified theory in any way that is the same as the test of the original theory. Ad hoc amendments are likely to avoid the possibility of being authenticated by narrowing the scope of potential evidence, which is obviously not acceptable to the independently, and the opposite is more likely to be accepted by them (testable, which can be independently tested, that is, a new examination of the original theory).

6.3 Then no evidence of the evidence in the end and confirm which is the key to scientific progress? The extreme discoveries are either marked by confirmation of bold conjecture (such as Neptune's discovery) or by a sign of cautious conjecture (such as Russell's set paradox), the former means that it can increase scientific knowledge, mark the emergence of new things, and the latter can increase knowledge because it confirms that there is no doubt that the proposition is wrong. Only the bold conjecture of the evidence and the cautious conjecture did not contribute to science. It's easy to say that you think about what you've done, or where everyone thinks there's no problem. You find the problem is scientific progress. //

6.4 As the relative value mentioned above makes sense, so the meaning of boldness and prudence is also relative and has its historical background. The background is basically composed of cautious conjecture, because it is believed that these conjectures have been confirmed, the confirmation of a daring conjecture is based on the background conjecture of a certain piece of evidence, corroboration and no proof in a sense is unified.

6.5 Thus, it can be seen that the difference between the corroboration of the inductive and the corroboration, and that the theory supports as much observation as possible, this kind of support can be regarded as irrelevant to the historical background. This should mean that the theory of induction is more likely to lead to the concept of the perspective of the Whig history, the more easily to the non-Whig view of history. It can also compare the pros and cons of the two, and obviously there is no evidence of the advantages, it does not need to deal with (absolute) the truth of the problem, only concerned about progress.

7.1 However, there is also a limitation of the theory that, logically, the observation of the proposition O is true to be confirmed (if a swan is black) then can be introduced without O, T (such as swans are white) is false. Good want to spit slot Lu Xudong translation is far less than the previous version of accessible, and this book three version of the change is very large, Qiu's translation is also a. The meaning of this sentence is that the observation of the proposition O is true can testify to the theory T, the same t really means o false, the two are logically mutually exclusive. However, there is no evidence that the observation is the infiltration theory and can be wrong, then the O and T contradictions will not be able to get t must be wrong, it may be o wrong. Further, now that the theoretical system is so complex that it may require some auxiliary hypotheses or lemmas, we are less sure whether we have observed the error or the theory is wrong or that one of the auxiliary assumptions is wrong, that is, the Dieng-Quinn argument. There are many examples in the history of science that show that the theory is to avoid being authenticated by shifting the line of sight the Copernican revolution, in particular, is not inconsistent with the induction of the doctrine of not incompatible with the attitude of no evidence, is very proud, so Kuhn in writing "The structure of the scientific Revolution," another book devoted to the Copernican revolution. //

The criteria for the determination of the 7.2 wave and Poole's falsification The theory should be tested by observation and experiment, but if the proposition of many knowledge categories is not qualified, it leads to many unscientific knowledge becoming science. This range is too broad, and any assertion of rigor is in line with the falsification, such as some ingenious astrological claims. Whether or not the advocates emphasize that these propositions are not only falsified but not falsified. The patch has gone too far because it excludes some of the universally accepted theories. //

8.1 In the face of such a situation, there is a growing consensus that a more rational interpretation of science must begin with the theoretical framework of the occurrence of scientific activity, which requires people to pay attention to those theories in the history of Science (the theory is as a whole of the structure). (Just as writing a dictionary requires mastering a certain vocabulary, the definition of a concept comes in part from the theory itself.) )

8.2 The first proposition is Kuhn's paradigm (paradigm) structure, which is characterized by scientific progress in the form of the former science-the normal science-crisis-revolution-the new normal science-the new crisis ... The structure of the scientific revolution "the road after the structure"//the distinction between science and non-science lies in whether the normal science can provide a paradigm, the normal science is in the relevant paradigm under the guidance of the problem-solving activities, different paradigms between the irreducible//Like the parallel universe//, Shifting from one paradigm to another means that the conversion of gestalt (which is irrational and not standard) also means that it is impossible to logically determine which paradigm is superior because the criteria they judge are based on their own structure. When the majority of the scientific community chose to turn, it marked the advent of scientific revolution. It is clear that this approach is the social deconstruction of science, which has caused many scientists dissatisfaction. Compared with the gradual scientific accumulation of induction, this revolutionary proposition is a mutant. //

9.1 The second is Lakatos's research programme, which, he argues, holds that the importance of scientific propositions in a theoretical structure is not the same, that there is a hard core (hard core) and a lot of additional hard core hypotheses called protective bands (protective belt// As we say in questioning the Dieng-Quinn argument///) Lakatos on Kuhn's basis that the hard core is free from the proof//Because the paradigm is not good or bad, but is abandoned//, if the observation is correct, only to admit that the protection belt is wrong. He uses the Help-discovery method (heuristic, a help-finding method is a set of clues that helps to discover or invent) to characterize the program, and the Anti-Discovery Act (negative~) advises scientists not to do anything to help find the law (positive~) to explain what scientists should do.

9.2 The development of the research programme is not only the development of the protection belt (which can be independently tested or not ad hoc), but also the appropriate experimental techniques and mathematical methods. The development of the program to a more mature stage of experimental verification is meaningful, when the corroboration is more important than the proof. The value of the evaluation programme is to see the extent to which its foresight is confirmed. A progressive (progressive) Programme of research should be consistent and at least intermittently available to provide a proven new vision, and a retrogressive (degenerating) research programme cannot be consistent or provide conclusive, novel predictions.

9.3 Scientific Revolution is a progressive program instead of a regressive one. This is an interpretation of the spectre of relativism in the turn of Kuhn's paradigm, but what kind of foresight is new? No proof or cautious conjecture of the bold conjecture of the evidence is naturally novel, Lakatos tried to use it but found it incompatible with his agenda (as some of the Copernican revolution foresaw nothing new), and Waller changed it: progress does not imply novelty and foresight but nature (and "Design" "ad hoc" The contrary) foresees confirmation, but how to find "universal" criteria to evaluate them? At the same time, another question of the Lakatos theory is why the hard core cannot be changed, and in the history of science we can find the counter case, from the realistic point of view, could we actually control the hard core from the proof? This is the common problem of Kuhn and Lakatos theory, how does the scientific community collaborate to accomplish such a move?

9.4 Any scientific theory has the significance of the history of science, lakatos that a certain kind of scientific methodology or philosophy of science can be examined according to the history of science and technology. (Kuhn and Popper disagree.) ）

10.1 It seems that the representation that seeks to distinguish between science and other knowledge fails, and Feyerabend therefore suggests that there is no such special method, and that even science does not have features that make itself seem superior to other knowledge, and that it is unreasonable for the society to give its exalted status to Science, To attach great importance to science is a kind of dogmatism similar to medieval Christianity oppression. (Objection method: Outline of the anarchist epistemology) he mocked Lakatos as a disguised anarchist, because his theory was broad to be compatible with anything, he created the irreducible covenant independently, and rejected Kuhn's social consensus on the scientific community, saying that Kuhn could not distinguish the rationality of consensus. Do not agree with each other why not kill it, a little chapter of the North Sea meaning//even resort to consensus can not distinguish between science and other knowledge.

10.2 Feyerabend advocates a humanitarian freedom that can provide proof of his anarchist view of science, which has freed scientists from the shackles of methodology and the freedom to choose between science and other knowledge. But at present our scientific system and humanitarianism do not match, although we have the freedom of religious belief but in school we can only learn science but not witchcraft! He believes that society should be the people who are free to choose the best fit for themselves, rather than imposing science on each other. In short, there is no scientific method, how to drop all line! But it is clear that freedom is not absolute and that in reality scientists ' actions are limited by the resources they control, a utopian idea that cannot be accepted by most countries.

11.1 Feyerabend against is a universal, non historical scientific method, the so-called non-historical point is that this method can discriminate the past present and future all science. Chalmers, however, chooses a golden mean that there may be some methods and standards in science but different from the subject, and that it can become more and more good in a subject. Kind of like technology-independent evolution? //

11.2 At the same time, the socialization construction of science also faces some problems, the scientific professionalization causes it to face the benefit problem itself, from this point of view, it is not unreasonable for egalitarianism or feyerabend to require science to be sanctified.

(Galileo's acceptance process was a particularly interesting process, in which people were generally unable to observe the outer planets but believed that the unaided eye was trustworthy, so observations supported Aristotle, but Galileo thought that the telescope instrument could improve cognitive effects. According to Aristotle's model is divided into the moon and the upper region, is followed by different physical rules, how to ensure that the telescope to see is true? Of course we can generalize by observing on Earth, but this is not much convincing, after all, it is impossible for him to fly to the moon to verify the telescope's observations with the naked eye. Galileo then used some propaganda techniques to "trick" people into believing. ）

12.1 To turn to the other two methods, one is the Bayesian school of thought, they believe that a fully justified propositional probability of 0 is not appropriate (4.4), they will pass the probability Bayes theorem to prove the existence of a non-0 probability proposition. They took some assumptions for granted and computed the transcendental probabilities (i.e. Popper's so-called background knowledge) as a background.

P (h/e) is the probability that the hypothesis H occurs under the Evidence E, P (h) is the probability of the absence of e-time hypothesis H, p (e/h) is the probability of giving evidence e when the hypothesis H is established, P (e) is the probability that e occurs when H is absent.

12.2 Objective Bayes: probability represents the probability that rational actors should accept according to objective circumstances. The mainstream is subjective Bayes: The Bayesian theorem deals with the subjective confidence level. To put it simply, they think that although different scientists have different attitudes towards assuming H, this is subjective, but as evidence E confirms that people tend to think that p (e/h) tends to be 1, a scientist who initially agreed with H would give h a higher probability, and a scientist who didn't agree at first would raise the trust of H and eventually everyone would agree. Of course, as the experiment continues to repeat, there will be a marginal diminishing effect, each time the confirmation of E to bring the increase of H probability will be less. //

12.3 Such a Bayesian theorem can explain why the ad hoc nature is unpopular and use different evidence to prove that the same theory is more advantageous than a particular proof. The problem is that the probability is the subjective degree of people's belief, through logical reasoning to the subjective transcendental into an objective posterior, then we still can not evaluate the relative value, and we should choose whose subjective beliefs or the overall subjective beliefs? (What Bayes really can say is that if you accept the evidence as a true influence on your hypothesis, it has nothing to do with whether you eventually accept the hypothesis or whether you accept the evidence, except to tell us that science and observation are governed by deductive logic that does not explain any problem.) ）

13.1 Another point of view is the new experimental doctrine, that is, the experiment may have a independent of the theory of their own lives. Not very understanding of the necessity of this doctrine, it may be considered that they through extremely strict controlled experiments to prove independent of high-level theory of foresight and evaluation, can refer to the additional paradox, high-level theory such as relativity in Newton's mechanics is a high-level theory, Einstein's general theory of relativity to its gravitational theory is also a high-level theory. Mayo equate the normal science with the experimental activity, whether the experiment confirms or not, it has its meaning, especially can learn from the mistake to trigger the scientific revolution. And the life of the experiment is not to make a proof of a theory, but also to provide a new observation tool, the same theory can have some life, high-level theory is not necessarily due to some experiments. Can not complete the universal representation of science. //

14.1 From the above epistemology category back to the category of ontology, why do we seek scientific laws, because we believe that the world is following the law, law means the rules? (Chalmers don't think so) does the law have cause and effect? Hume and logical positivism are very skeptical about this//law is the characterization of the dynamic forces or tendencies? That's what Aristotle thinks.

15.1 There is another question, are we observing the reality? Comprehensive anti-realism (global anti-realism) including the scientific field we cannot use any language and the world to connect; anti-realism, tool theory, science is just the tool that we know the world, scientific realism (scientific realism), The purpose of science is to provide true propositions of world existence and world activities at all levels, not just observation levels; conjecture realism (conjectural realism), knowledge is wrong. Our past claims about world reality can be replaced by more advanced interpretations. Structural realism (structual realism), non-representation realism (unrepresentative realism).

There is no universal claim for scientific and scientific methods so that it can be applied to all historical stages of scientific and scientific development.