Logon type 2 Interactive 本地互動登入。最常見的登入方式。
Logon type 3 Network 網路登入 - 最常見的是訪問網際網路共用檔案夾或印表機。IIS的認證也是Type 3
Logon type 4 Batch 計劃任務
Logon Type 5 Service 服務
Logon Type 7 Unlock 解除螢幕鎖定
Logon Type 8 NetworkCleartext 網路明文登入 -- 通常發生在IIS 的 ASP登入。不推薦
Logon Type 9 NewCredentials 新身份登入 -- 通常發生在RunAS方式運行某程式時的登入驗證。
Logon Type 10 RemoteInteractive 遠程登入 -- 比如Terminal service或者RDP方式。但是Windows 2000是沒有Type10的，用Type 2。WindowsXP/2003起有Type 10
Logon Type 11 CachedInteractive 緩衝登入
The logon/logoff category of the Windows security log gives you the ability to monitor all attempts to access the local computer. In this article I’ll examine each logon type in greater detail and show you how some other fields in Logon/Logoff events can be helpful for understanding the nature of a given logon attempt.
Event IDs 528 and 540 signify a successful logon, event ID 538 a logoff and all the other events in this category identify different reasons for a logon failure. However, just knowing about a successful or failed logon attempt doesn’t fill in the whole picture. Because of all the services Windows offers, there are many different ways you can logon to a computer such as interactively at the computer’s local keyboard and screen, over the network through a drive mapping or through terminal services (aka remote desktop) or through IIS. Thankfully, logon/logoff events specify the Logon Type code which reveals the type of logon that prompted the event.
Logon Type 2 – Interactive
This is what occurs to you first when you think of logons, that is, a logon at the console of a computer. You’ll see type 2 logons when a user attempts to log on at the local keyboard and screen whether with a domain account or a local account from the computer’s local SAM. To tell the difference between an attempt to logon with a local or domain account look for the domain or computer name preceding the user name in the event’s description. Don’t forget that logon’s through an KVM over IP component or a server’s proprietary “lights-out” remote KVM feature are still interactive logons from the standpoint of Windows and will be logged as such.
Logon Type 3 – Network
Windows logs logon type 3 in most cases when you access a computer from elsewhere on the network. One of the most common sources of logon events with logon type 3 is connections to shared folders or printers. But other over-the-network logons are classed as logon type 3 as well such as most logons to IIS. (The exception is basic authentication which is explained in Logon Type 8 below.)
Logon Type 4 – Batch
When Windows executes a scheduled task, the Scheduled Task service first creates a new logon session for the task so that it can run under the authority of the user account specified when the task was created. When this logon attempt occurs, Windows logs it as logon type 4. Other job scheduling systems, depending on their design, may also generate logon events with logon type 4 when starting jobs. Logon type 4 events are usually just innocent scheduled tasks startups but a malicious user could try to subvert security by trying to guess the password of an account through scheduled tasks. Such attempts would generate a logon failure event where logon type is 4. But logon failures associated with scheduled tasks can also result from an administrator entering the wrong password for the account at the time of task creation or from the password of an account being changed without modifying the scheduled task to use the new password.
Logon Type 5 – Service
Similar to Scheduled Tasks, each service is configured to run as a specified user account. When a service starts, Windows first creates a logon session for the specified user account which results in a Logon/Logoff event with logon type 5. Failed logon events with logon type 5 usually indicate the password of an account has been changed without updating the service but there’s always the possibility of malicious users at work too. However this is less likely because creating a new service or editing an existing service by default requires membership in Administrators or Server Operators and such a user, if malicious, will likely already have enough authority to perpetrate his desired goal.