Debian catastrophic Vulnerability

The following is an excerpt from the metasploit blog.
The bug
On May 13th, 2008 The Debian project announced that Luciano Bello found an interesting vulnerability in the OpenSSL package they were distributing. the bug in question was caused by the removal of the following line of code from md_rand.c

Md_update (& M, Buf, J );
[...]
Md_update (& M, Buf, J);/* purify complains */

These lines were removed because they caused the valgrind and purify tools to produce warnings about the use of uninitialized data in any code that was linked to OpenSSL. you can see one such report to the OpenSSL team here. removing this code has the side effect of crippling the seeding process for the OpenSSL PRNG. instead of mixing in random data for the initial seed, the only "random" value that was used was the current process ID. on the Linux platform, the default maximum process ID is 32,768, resulting in a very small number of seed values being used for all PRNG operations.

All keys generated on the Debian platform from 2006.9 to are affected. Debian quickly fixed the vulnerability and provided the blacklists and self-check tools.

Attack tools should soon appear. metasploit has generated a key database. You can use a method similar to Rainbow to query the database, or directly crack the SSH key.

Now let's wait for the worm to show up.

Because this vulnerability is serious, we hereby record it and save it here.

related links:
http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi? Bug = 363516
http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi? Bug = 363516
http://metasploit.com/users/hdm/tools/debian-openssl/
http://www.gossamer-threads.com/lists/fulldisc/full-disclosure/61666
http://www.gossamer-threads.com/lists/fulldisc/full-disclosure/61606
http://www.debian.org/security/2008/dsa-1571