Enough experience to circumstantial evidence of your cognition.

Have enough experience to circumstantial evidence of your cognition (the language of the word), there are enough language areas to describe your experience

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In this paper, we analyze the interaction between cognitive and belief systems (belief systems) and systems, and explore ways in which they affect economic performance. We believe that a more profound understanding of the emergence of institutions, the characteristics of its operation and its impact on economic and political outcomes should begin with an analysis of the cognitive process. We analyze the nature of individual and collective learning, and think that the question is not whether the body (agents) is purely rational or limited in reason, but how people make inferences and make choices, no matter if the choice and reasoning are made by individuals or collectively. Next we associate the learning process with the institutional analysis and propose a view that we can call "cognitive system Doctrine" (cognitive institutionalism). At the same time, we think that to fully understand the phenomenon of path dependence, we should start from the analysis of the cognitive level, take the analysis of the system as the backbone, and end with the analysis of the economic level.

The biggest challenge for social scientists is how to explain change-or, more specifically, how to interpret social, political, economic, and organizational changes. The starting point of our analysis must begin with the discourse of human Learning (human learning), which is the most fundamental prerequisite for explaining such changes. Learning ability is the main reason why human behavior is malleable (plasticity), and the interaction between individuals leads to social, political, economic and organizational changes. Because learning is the main object of cognitive research, any dogmatic attitude prevents social scientists from paying attention to the results of cognitive studies, thus losing the opportunity to interpret changes. Over the past decades, the revolution in cognitive science has brought many valuable insights into the learning process of individuals in different types of environments, which is why cognitive science is not only of importance to social scientists, but should be the main reason for any serious discussion of social change.

In this paper, we discuss the nature of individual learning, analyze the process of collective learning and discuss how the system can produce problems. Then, we establish a link between learning and overall economic performance, and at the end of the article, we analyze the problem of path dependence.

Individual Learning (individual learning )

Over the past decades, research in the field of cognition has greatly deepened our understanding of the relationship between the brain, mind and behavior. In particular, studies in the field of cognitive neuroscience (cognitive neuroscience) have deepened our understanding of how brain structures relate to psychological phenomena (mental phenomena) and human behavior. The human cognitive structure is the product of the long-term evolutionary process, and the main problem we face is how the human genetic structure interacts with the human cultural environment (cultural conditions). The human genetic structure evolved from adapting to the changing human environment, and the human cultural environment was the result of the institutional architecture created by humans to optimize their own environment.

It is not surprising that cognition is still a very young science, so there are different understandings of the concepts of cognition, learning, memory and response (attention). How to understand the nature of cognitive processes and the interaction between consciousness and brain is a more controversial issue. In order to better apply cognitive knowledge to political science, economics and other social sciences, it is important to keep in mind the central issues that we have to analyze in our research programmes. For our purposes-to understand the issue of social change-an applicable theory must provide us with the following analytical advantages:

To provide an explanation for the process of individual learning;

can provide satisfactory explanations for the selection process (choice processes);

Because our ultimate concern is political change and economic performance, so theory should provide us with the basis for explaining social learning.

The approach we propose is to think of the mind as a complex structure that can proactively interpret the various signals received through the senses while classifying them. The mind classifies the experiences that people receive from the real world and from the socio-cultural-linguistic environment (sociocultural-linguistic environment). Many psychological representations are seen as a cognitive model (cognitive models), which describes mental activity (mental operation), which is an issue of interest to us. While the debate over the conceptual aspects of mental models has never ceased and is inconclusive, we have found a pragmatic approach to mental models (pragmatic notion of mental Models) is most consistent with the needs of our research purposes. At the same time as cognitive development (cognitive development), our mental models are becoming more perfect, and we are gradually organizing our cognition (organize our perceptions) and preserving our memories. As a "flexible" (flexible) knowledge structure, they are usually formed in the actual response (pragmatic response) to a problem context (problem situation), which is intended to interpret the environment.

Mental patterns are best understood as the predictions or expectations of the mind of the environment prior to environmental feedback. Mental patterns can be modified, improved, or completely negated, depending on whether the expectations are tested by environmental feedback (environmental feedback). Learning is the complex process by which humans modify mental patterns based on the feedback they get from the environment. The special point of the human learning process is that the correction process of the mental model is closely connected with the "characterization of representational redescription". The so-called "characterization of the Re-description" refers to a process in which the knowledge originally used to solve a particular problem in the environment is rearranged (reordered) to solve a wider range of problems.

However, the formation of mental patterns and the testing of solutions (which are used to solve problems in the environment) do not necessarily lead to success. Learning is a trial-and-error (Trial and error), progressive process, and the failure of a solution often leads to attempts at new solutions. Since mental patterns are often a "flexible cognitive structure" (which helps people solve the problems they encounter), it is interesting to explore the relationship between environmental feedback and the correction or stability of mental models.

When environmental feedback confirms the same mental pattern multiple times, the mental model is "stabilized" in some way (stabilized). We call this relatively solid (crystallized) mental Model A "belief", a belief system in which the interrelated beliefs (which can be consistent or inconsistent) are called. The belief system allows individuals to adapt to the environment, so that the belief system is linked to the motivational system (motivational system). In other words, the belief system is increasingly affected by the corresponding emotional adaptation process (emotional adaptation), so it installs a "filter" for all stimuli, so we may safely say that the belief system does not change dramatically.

When a solution based on a particular psychological pattern fails to succeed, the individual infers-especially by analogy-is an almost instinctive response (Quasi-automatic way). If this reasoning does not solve the problem faced by the individual, then he has to "seek another way"-that is, to establish a new psychological model and try new solutions. This is the process of choice, which is most clearly reflected in the psychological process (mental probing) in which individual solutions are screened when confronted with new problems.

Environmental feedback is the primary factor in determining the success of a mental model (and its subsequent stabilization or correction process). In short, the key to creative decision-making (creativity choice) or learning is the feedback from the environment of the individual's awareness-the feedback that the individual is getting from the environment when solving the problems encountered. Clearly, no one can guarantee that the environmental feedback we receive is accurate. Information about whether a particular solution succeeds or fails is often misinterpreted, because consciousness is a dynamic interpretation of all the perceptual information received. In fact, creed and myth, superstition and ideology are all based on this imperfect belief system, but they are all over the whole history. This requires us to pay more attention to the learning process that produces these beliefs, just as we do with the learning process that correctly explains the problems facing humankind.

There is no doubt that the theory we are proposing here needs further refinement. We believe, however, that it provides us with a meaningful entry point for establishing an analytical framework, as it complies with all of the three criteria we have previously proposed. It provides us with a relatively satisfying answer to understanding individual learning and decision-making processes, and it also provides a solid foundation for understanding the process of social learning, which is what we are going to discuss next.

Collective learning and change

The learning process at the social level can best be understood as a common (shared) or collective learning process. When we try to explain the emergence of social or cultural knowledge, we must differentiate between the two aspects of shared learning (shared learning), namely, stability (static) and evolution (evolutionary).

The so-called stability, is in the established social and cultural environment of individuals, in order to solve the problems they face and constantly communicate with other individuals. The direct result of this communication is the formation of a collective mental model, which provides a common framework for interpreting the reality and provides a collective interpretation of the problems in the environment. The importance of this process is obvious, because a common understanding of reality is the premise of any deep social interaction.

How will the collective mental models of social organizations change over time? The process of changing collective mental models-that is, the process of joint learning or collective learning-depends on the size of the organization and thus is varied within the organization or society as a whole. Collective learning first appears in families, neighborhoods, and schools (i.e. within the organization). The modern organization learning theory (organizational learning) regards the Organization as the system of distributing knowledge, in which the ability is formed through knowledge exchange (shaped). On the social level, the process of cultural evolution is the process of accumulation and dissemination of knowledge. Merlin Donald Merlin stressed the importance of "external symbolic storage" (external symbolic storage) in the accumulation and dissemination of intergenerational knowledge. The key innovation that gives great support to the evolution of "theoretical" culture is the simple habit of "recording ideas"-that is, the process of "externalizing the verbal commentary and the event" (the Oral Commentary and events). This phenomenon has existed in China, India, Egypt and Mesopotamia for at least 1000 years before the advent of Greece (about 700 BC). "For the first time in human history, complex ideas have been placed on the public stage through external media, so that they will undergo time-tested refinement, meaning that they will continue beyond a single person's life." "These external symbolic memory networks have greatly advanced the accumulation of theoretical knowledge-the knowledge that is communicated through symbols (natural symbols or artificial symbols)-because they provide a constant interaction between the ontology of scientific knowledge and the theoretical problems faced by individuals in society."

However, the knowledge stock transmitted by intergenerational means is not confined to theoretical knowledge. Another type of knowledge-practical knowledge (practical knowledge), or "practical skills"-is not disseminated through language; It is disseminated through direct imitation of other people's practices. Practical knowledge refers to all the skills that are gained in solving practical problems-swimming, cooking, cycling, driving, typing-which is equally important in the daily lives of all social individuals.

As collective learning occurs at the social level, the ability of a society to solve problems (including theoretical-scientific knowledge and practical knowledge) grows and spreads over time. However, a subspecies of practical knowledge--on how to solve social problems in human interactions--in many cases is not considered to have grown over time. At this point, we must go beyond Hayek (Friedrich A. von Hayek). Hayek equated the progress of civilization with the growth of knowledge, including "Our customs, technology, emotional orientation (emotional attitude), tools and systems"-all of which are adaptations of past experiences and are preserved by selectively eliminating those that are not adapted (by Selective elimination of less suitable contact). We must build an architecture that is more analytical in order to understand the social system and to analyze their evolution in depth.

Collective learning and the emergence of institutions

System is the game rule of the Society (rules of the game), or more formally, is designed by people to regulate the interaction between people a series of constraints. The system includes formal rules (constitutions, decrees, common law and Regulations), informal rules (customs, ethical norms and social norms) and their implementation characteristics. Because they constitute the incentive structure of society, the system stipulates the game mode of the specific period. When the system is theoretical, it is helpful to differentiate it from inside and outside the system.

Externally, the system is the common code of Conduct (shared behavioral regularities) or common behavior (shared routines) in a particular population. Internally, they are nothing more than a collective mental model or a collective approach to problem solving, in order to solve recurring problems in social interactions. This is because the system is deep in people's consciousness, so they have an impact on people's behavior. Understanding the internal aspects of the system is a key step for us to fully understand the system's emergence, evolution and institutional utility; it is it that determines the difference between the system and other perspectives from a cognitive perspective, Although the rational choice pattern is useful for us to understand the cognitive process (it is a stereotyped way of understanding all psychological behavior as a choice, which is the premise of behavior). Although we can pay due attention to the rational selection process, the cognitive approach of the system does not adhere to the rational hypothesis (which is measured by some externality criteria), nor does it neglect the generalized psychological process-quasi-inference (analogical reasoning) and the formation of skills (skill formation) and so on-they play an important role in the formation of a collective problem-solving approach. As mentioned earlier, the collective problem-solving approach is designed to address recurring problems in social interaction (i.e., the system).

Systems can have different effects, one of which is to provide incentives for creating organizations (provision of incentives to create organizations). Here, it is helpful to differentiate the system from the organization. System is the rule of game, while organization is the participant of game. The latter includes groups of individuals who have been united for a common purpose. For example, a company is an economic organization, a political organization, and a university as an educational organization. As the collective mental model evolves within the organization, collective learning is also under way to achieve common goals.

The emergence of informal systems and formal systems follows different mechanisms. The informal system in a society is produced and changed in the process of spontaneous interaction, it is "indeed the product of human behavior, but not the result of anyone's design". The emergence of informal system is a spontaneous innovation and imitation process in the social organization of collective learning. The observance of custom, moral norms and social norms has led to the formation of social order (the formation of social order is the unintended consequence of the behavior of individual compliance). In closely knit groups, the informal system is, to a considerable extent, sufficient to stabilize expectations and provide discipline (discipline), since it is the personal relationship that sustains the members of the organization. In primitive society, the simple informal system can also establish social order, so there is usually no need to set up other systems that are implemented by explicit third parties.

This leads to a central issue of political science, that is, why to establish a national problem. The state exists because it can provide trust to individuals and protect them from harassment (from individuals within the same society or from individuals in other societies). Once the scale of society becomes larger and the relationship between members of society becomes increasingly "non-personal" (impersonal), the state emerges. In a large organization or society, trust becomes a scarce commodity, because of relative, reciprocal tendencies and expectations of the future are reduced. Individuals with the ability to learn must find that when they are acting in a large organization, the likelihood of encountering a "traitor" (defector) increases. Because-as we said above-the content of individual learning depends largely on environmental feedback, and individuals in large organizations (for example, a complex modern society) can get completely different experiences and lessons than individuals in small organizations (for example, a primitive tribe). It is this very different learning process that determines whether the country that is a mandatory institution will emerge.

For example, in a large society, with the advancement of the non-personal process (impersonalization), if a "smart" person realizes the potential benefits of fraud and begins to deceive other people in the organization, it is enough to open the process of national formation. Other people in the organization will imitate him, and soon there will be plenty of "hitchhiking". As a result, feedback from the environment is changed by other people (not fraudsters or good people). Together they will find that cooperation is good for everyone, but there are a lot of fraudsters, and because the number of fraudsters is so large, the cost of punishing fraudsters is greatly increased.

This collective "learning process" (collective lesson) has far-reaching implications: in order to prevent the act of hitchhiking, there are calls for protection. Each individual will be asked to take coercive measures against hitchhiking to solve the hitch-hiker problem. There are two ways in which the protection function can be implemented: one is to take time and energy to unite against the Hitchhiker each time a hitch is committed, and another is to create a specialized body to deal with hitchhiking and to protect the good. Given the huge transaction costs faced by the first approach, it seems conceivable that some of those who have ideas will set up an institution to provide protection from which to reap the benefits.

There is no reason to believe that there will only be one agency that provides protection. On the contrary, there will be a large number of protection institutions in a society that provide protection in exchange for money or other items, where "protection" becomes a commodity. In fact, the special thing about "protecting" this commodity is that violence provides the protection Agency with the opportunity to suppress members of the group that they are supposed to protect. The entrepreneurs of the operating protection institutions are only constrained by the generally accepted informal rules of a particular society-the practices, moral rules and social norms that were recognized at the time.

Since there are only informal rules, and these entrepreneurs have violent mechanisms, there may be three relationships between the protection agencies: mutual cooperation, competition or mutual peace, and everyone squarely. In a trial-and-error process, they will try all of the above relational patterns: from armed fighting to a complete merger with each other (the purpose of the merger is to better control the protected person). The outcome of this evolutionary process is not fully determined beforehand, as it depends on the creativity (creativity) of the entrepreneurs (or rulers), their expectations of winning the war, and their effectiveness in controlling the "protected ones".

We must be careful to address the question of whether only one protective organization ultimately wins the battle, thus monopolizing the right to use force legally in a particular territory. It is only partly right to stress the state's view of the monopoly power of force. It would undoubtedly be wrong to interpret the so-called monopoly of force as it would cover the entire society or civilization (cultural community)-that is, all individuals would have a common mental model and follow the same informal system. Historically, the opposite examples include the ancient Greek state of Independence and medieval territory. In the narrow sense, however, the view of the state's monopoly of force is correct: the protection institutions have exclusive rights to the people they protect. The process of cooperation or competition between protection agencies (which have a monopoly on the use of force against persons under their protection) can-but is not necessarily-lead to monopolistic consequences (monopolistic outcome).

Thus, in the process of evolution characterized by collective learning, Division of labour and competition or cooperation among rulers, one or more protective institutions can be preserved in society. Since their primary function is to provide protection in exchange for goods or money, they form a protective state or a country that provides protection in exchange for tax . But is there a difference between the protection agency and the protective state? The only analytical importance of these distinctions seems to be that the protection mechanism appears early in the evolutionary process, while the protective state is the final product of the process. One of the characteristics of a protective state is a great deal of stability, for both the ruler and the subjects have undergone a learning process. The subjects gradually discovered that maintaining the presence of a protective state was a very costly thing (if the rulers explicitly disallowed their subjects from "giving up" their protection), and the rulers knew how the other rulers had ruled, and thus were able to understand which form of domination was the most successful. Thus, the difference is only in degree rather than in nature (kind).

This evolutionary view is in harmony with human history. In Western Europe, there has never been a overlord since the death of Charlemagne, but there are always many rulers who have been mired in war for a long time. However, regional hegemony, such as the Ming Dynasty and the Qing Dynasty, and the Roman Empire, have maintained regional dominance for quite a long period of time.

In short, the informal system arises internally-that is, they are born within the community. In comparison, the formal system is the internal result of the evolution of relations between rulers, and it is the product of the community imposed from the outside. We lack a universal theory that tells us how politics works, and how the protective state can assume more and more functions (providing a lot of public goods, not just providing protection). Although recent developments in the field of political science have made a valuable prediction of the outcome of politics, it is mainly used in the United States and other developed countries. This means that it is basically implemented in the network of constitutional principles and other political rules, which in the short term appear to be an "unstable constant". Another more general theory of politics attempts to analyze the political operation and the impact of ideology on political outcomes from the perspective of transaction costs. The ideological theory, which contains empirical content (although this theory still needs to be perfected) can be the entry point for the study of the evolutionary process of the common mental model of political actors, and it is this common mental model that leads to the emergence and legalization of new political rules, which in turn has an impact on human interaction. The process of selection will undoubtedly become an integral part of this theory, but it does not necessarily play a role in the way that rational selectors in the field of political science preach. The question is not whether individual or collective decision-making processes should be considered "rational" (based on external normative standards), but rather on how the belief system is formed and how the common cognitive model solves the common problems faced by social groups.

The relationship between the formal system and the informal system is important for policy issues. Policy is a change in the formal system, but the consequences of the policy arise in the formal system and in the informal system (and the process of implementation). Thus, a greater understanding of the interactive process between formal and informal rules is a necessary condition for improving economic performance.

Economic performance

Once the rules are established, the next step in the analysis is to explore how economic markets evolve and evolve within the institutional framework. The transaction costs resulting from the formation, diffusion and Classification of Knowledge (division) are high or low, depending on the type of system being applied and the characteristics of its implementation. By stabilizing expectations, the appropriate system will bring higher security to the transaction. This is accompanied by lower transaction costs, higher net income (captured gains) and, ultimately, higher economic performance.

The best way to illustrate these assertions is to separate transactions (Exchange) from competition and to analyze how they relate to knowledge classification, formation, and transaction costs. Neo-classical economics theory seldom concerns this issue, they often equate the concept of "market" and "competition". We define the market as a process of dealing, defining competition as a behavior not just in the market, but also in politics and organizations-and in any place where two or more individuals are fighting each other for the same purpose. We will first analyze how systems, market transactions and the diffusion of knowledge are linked. Next we will analyze how the institutional framework affects market competition and how it leads to the growth and accumulation of knowledge.

The exchange process brings about a division of labour, which is accompanied by a knowledge classification between market actors. In fact, everyone can only master different kinds of knowledge because they can only specialize in specific jobs. This brings two problems theoretically: the coordination of knowledge and the effective use of knowledge. As mentioned earlier, as a common way to solve social problems, the system is deeply embedded in (anchored) people's consciousness. For the Human Cognitive Landscape (landscape), the main role of shared mental models or shared knowledge is to coordinate individual activities at the behavioral level. In the course of the long evolutionary socialization, the social members established the same cognitive structure and formed their own behavior law (behavioral regularities). As a result, there is a common social rule between individuals engaged in market transactions and other actors in the market. He is not a non-historical individual who only knows how to maximize his own interests under certain constraints (for example, a particular price and expected income).

In the process of socialization, individuals acquire the customary, moral and social norms of the society in which they live. When they start to engage in marketing activities (start their business), the business owners know which rules they must abide by, under what circumstances property rights will be protected by the state, and under what circumstances the state will intervene in property rights. They know all about it. They have become "legal persons" as legal theory says. Through the same learning process, business owners and other market actors are complying with a number of formal and informal systems and game rules. This makes them the specific actors in a particular economic game.

Therefore, firstly, the system can coordinate the knowledge between the market actors. It is obvious that the harmonization of knowledge will lead to different transaction costs, depending on the characteristics of the common learning process in a given society. For example, the institutional framework governing the Moroccan open-air Bazaar (Moroccan Suq) would bring high transaction costs if it was to reconcile the knowledge between market actors, especially when compared to the institutional framework of more complex markets (for example, the institutional framework of western developed countries).

Second, the price mechanism will assist in the coordination of knowledge in the market. Old Hayek's assertion is very insightful: the existence of price mechanisms in the market has greatly facilitated a deeper level of knowledge coordination between market actors, as compared with the absence of a market price mechanism (Hayekian, for example, a socialist economic system). Therefore, the coordination of knowledge in the market is the result of the system framework and price mechanism of the specific market.

When thinking about the role of the market in the accumulation of knowledge, we must understand what is happening in the exchange of supply and demand, assuming that all market actors understand the rules of the game. Trading is a process of communication in which the buyer and the seller form a common mental model. Therefore, at the beginning, the seller and the buyer did not form a "shared knowledge", nor did a virtual auctioneer remind them of each other's concerns. The emergence of a common communication architecture is a precondition for any trading behavior. Because the seller does not always make a correct estimate of the buyer's problem, the buyer is not aware of all potential sellers in the market and therefore the transaction is always "imperfect".

To avoid the misunderstandings that may arise here, we emphasize the distinction between shared mental models in trading processes and mental models that form the inner forms of social systems, although they have the same cognitive content. The most notable feature of the internalized game rules is that they are accepted by all market actors. On the contrary, the common mental models formed in the course of trading are temporary in nature, and more importantly, they are only recognized by some sellers and buyers. The existence of price mechanism is advantageous to the formation of common mental pattern in the course of trading.

In general, the lower the transaction cost of forming a shared mental model in the market, the more effective the use of knowledge in the economy. This assertion requires further argumentation. Bertin Martens explores the dilemma of knowledge classification faced by specialized actors with limited cognitive ability in the market. The behavioral body either uses most of its cognitive abilities to seek shared knowledge, to form a shared mental model with other actors, or to establish its own specialized mental model. What kind of choices the actors make ultimately will be affected by the transaction costs. The frequent conduct of transactions and the deepening of knowledge classification will result in higher transaction income and higher economic performance.

We have analyzed how systems, market transactions and knowledge diffusion are interconnected, and then we will explore how institutional frameworks affect market competition. The way in which competition prevails in the course of trading depends to a large extent on the prevailing system. System not only determines the type of competition, but also determines the frequency of competition occurrence. Therefore, the speed of the learning of the actors depends on the degree of competition, which in turn is determined by the institutional framework. Because of the existence of competition, the actors face the externality effect of potential loss of interest, so they have to study further to ensure their invincible position in the economic competition.

Technology arises as a spontaneous result of a competitive process. Why is it a spontaneous result? Because the main purpose of the organizations involved in economic competition-that is, companies-is to improve their own profits. To achieve this, they try to compete in a number of ways, and technology is just one way of doing it. The purpose of using scientific knowledge and a certain degree of knowledge innovation is only to hope that the profit can be obtained from it. Therefore, the upgrading of technology needs to be tested by the market-the economic benefits must be considered. This is why there is no simple causal link between systems, organizational activities and the renewal of technology.

Thus, the process of economic competition that brings technology applications and new knowledge is undoubtedly closely linked to market transactions. In order to make the technology work, the buyer in the market must have the appropriate absorptive capacity (absorptive capacity). In other words, only when the new technology (which is the result of competition between sellers) can be used by the buyer, they will greatly enhance the seller's profits. This reality has far-reaching implications for important policy issues, such as the proliferation of new technologies, particularly for the less developed countries of the world. The transfer of technology can only be achieved when the receiving party experiences the appropriate learning process. Therefore, communication and the formation of their shared mental models are prerequisites for the effective use of technology.

In short, economic performance is a result of the complex process of economic game. In this process, the actors conduct economic games on the basis of formal and informal rules that provide incentive structures and channels for the actors to innovate. The process of collective learning and the evolution of institutions in society do not necessarily lead to economic growth. In history, examples of failures are far more than examples of successes. It is important to understand that even though some of our practices are successful for an economy, they do not necessarily bring success to another economy. Even if some of our practices are correct today, they will not necessarily be correct tomorrow. Only when we understand the fundamental factors that lead to a path-dependent phenomenon can we hope to be able to reverse the economy in a specific direction.

Cognitive path dependence, institutional path dependence and economic path dependence

The process of social change discussed in this paper can be summarized as follows:

"Reality" > Belief > System > Specific policies > results (i.e. "reality" after change)

The feedback mechanism between results and reality needs to function through human consciousness. Because consciousness interprets reality in a dynamic way, we know very little about the process of understanding and interpreting the results of the behavior. This is the main reason why mechanical, fatalistic patterns of economic change do not work: ideas are independent factors that affect the process of socioeconomic evolution, and if we want to learn more about this process, we need to better understand how our consciousness "constructs" reality.

However, we can propose a hypothesis about how the shared mental model (scaffolding), which has been established, has an impact on the outcome during its continuous evolution. After Time T1 (that is, in people's systems, in the market to learn, the results have been formed), the consciousness based on the T1 of the mental model of the T2 when the reality (that is, the result of change) to interpret. For every individual in society, this is undoubtedly the case, so collective learning at T2 must be based on the shared mental model of T1. In other words, the shared mental model of T2 is based on the shared mental model of T1. When the content of collective learning has not changed for a long time, the collective mental model becomes relatively rigid and the collective belief system is formed. This, in turn, is the source of cognitive path dependence, because the more rigid the mental model, the more difficult it becomes to change them.

Because of the existence of cognitive path dependence, the accumulation of human vision (that is, the formation of institutions) will also form a path dependence. Once all the actors form the same mental model, the system (institutional mix) can solve social problems in a special way. Once the actors acquire some sort of problem-solving approach, they unconsciously apply it to other situations where similar problems arise, and we can call them "incremental rewards of institutional frameworks". As time goes by, institutional path dependence may regulate economic behavior in a standardized way, making the society have a game with unpredictable consequences.

As long as the institutional framework and incentive structure (incentive structure) remain the same, market interaction will be introduced (channeled) specific development direction, the development of specific technologies will be encouraged. Therefore, cognitive path dependence and institutional path dependence will ultimately lead to economic path dependence. One can intuitively conclude that "history works", which indicates the importance of path-dependent phenomena. The path dependence begins with the cognitive level, the middle passes through the system level, finally moves towards the economic level.

Conclusion

The analytical framework we have presented here is the first to suggest that learning plays a role in the formation of institutions and economic games, which occur in specific institutional frameworks. The next study should be devoted to theoretical construction, including the theory of how the political market works, the theory of how ideology is formed and functioning, and the relationship between formal and informal systems. The question of "learning" is of considerable importance to all these areas of research. That is why we must trace the course of cognitive development and apply its findings to our analysis. Our aim is to construct a more "refined" (refined) theory-a fairly operational theory that can be applied to policy issues.

Enough experience to circumstantial evidence of your cognition.