In-depth research on the routing protocol of the routing algorithm (1)

For a self-organizing network, the routing protocol of the eighth version is a key and difficult point. So today we will discuss some of the issues of this agreement, and here we will give you a closer look. The content of this article is as follows: Research on the routing black hole attack problem of the routing protocol in the Ad-hoc network, based on the idea of detecting intermediate response nodes and their next hop nodes, we hope to study a trusted routing algorithm suitable for the routing protocol. This allows the routing protocol to identify malicious nodes attacked by routing black holes, at the same time, it can further improve the performance of the secure routing protocol, including network throughput, the probability of successful receipt by group, network overhead and latency ｡

Based on the in-depth research on the routing protocol of the same route, the security threats faced by the Ad-hoc network, and the existing routing protocol of the same route, a trusted routing protocol of the same routing protocol is proposed, to solve the routing black hole in the routing protocol ｡

Based on the routing discovery policy of the DSR and the hop-by-hop routing, serial number, and periodic broadcast mechanism of the DSDV, The DTD is an on-demand routing protocol ｡

Each node dynamically generates and maintains an incomplete route table in the routing protocol. When the data arrives at the network layer, the node first searches for its route table, if there is a valid route to the target node, use this route to send data directly. Otherwise, the route creation process will be started ｡

Source node broadcast route request message (RREQ ), including the destination node address, destination node serial number, broadcast serial number, source node address, source node serial number, previous hop address, and number of hops. When the intermediate node receives RREQ, first, create a reverse route based on the information provided by the RREQ to the previous hop, and then find your route table. If a valid route entry is found to the target node, then, the reply message (RREP) is sent through the unicast return route through the reverse route ), this includes the source node address, target node address, target node serial number, number of hops, and survival time. Otherwise, the received RREQ is broadcast to the neighbor node until the RREQ reaches the node of the day ｡

RREP is generated by the target node and transmitted along the established reverse route to the source node. When the same RREQ has several different RREP (which may be issued by the target node or different intermediate nodes ), the source node uses the first RREP to arrive. If several RREP arrive at the same time, the source node selects the route with the maximum serial number of the target node, or if the serial number of the target node is the same, select the route with the smallest number of hops. Now, the route is created and can be used within its validity period ｡

When data is transmitted along the established route, the intermediate node is determined to have a valid route, but the next hop node cannot arrive (probably because of node movement or link disconnection) or when there is no valid route (for example, the validity period ends), the node broadcasts the route error message (RERR) to the neighbor node. RERR includes the Node Address and serial number that cannot be reached, all nodes that receive the RERR set the corresponding route to invalid, and broadcast the RERR, the source node will restart the route establishment process after receiving the RERR ｡

Malicious nodes capture their own RREQ messages by means of the broadcast mechanism of the routing protocol, and claim that they have the best route to the target node (by forging the number of hops or forging the serial number of the target node ), so that the source node uses this fake route. In this way, malicious nodes can easily intercept all data packets and form a "black hole" to absorb data packets "｡

When a malicious node receives a RREQ message, it does not need to look up the table or determine the validity of the route. Therefore, it often responds to the message from other routes to the source node, even if other correct route response messages arrive at the same time, the number of hops or the serial number of the target node is forged by a malicious node, make the source node look like the route has a shorter path (with a small number of hops) to reach the target node or is newer than other routes (with a large destination node serial number ), in this way, the source node selects a false route incorrectly ｡

Many researchers at home and abroad have done a lot of work to attack the Ad-hoc network and divide the attack behavior into the following categories: Denial of Service (Dos) attacks), Black hole, Replay, Rushing, and Tunneling attacks ｡