The issue of pirates ' separation of gold

1. There are 5 pirates, ranked from 5 to 1 by rank. The biggest pirates have the right to suggest how they can share 100 gold coins. But others will vote on it, and if the majority (the majority of the people) oppose it, then he is killed. What should he propose to do to get himself as much gold as possible without being killed?

The allocation scheme is 98,0,1,0,1

Level 5 pirates will not be killed, depending on the level of pirates after the death of the 5 to gain more benefits. If we can gain more benefits, we will certainly oppose it, and if there is less benefit, we will certainly support it, and if there is no change in interest, then it is possible to oppose or support it.
If level 5 pirates are dead, there are 4 levels of pirate distribution, and 4 pirates face the same problem, and need to look at the change of interest distribution after their death. Then there are Class 3 Pirates, Class 2 pirates.
Level 2 Pirates No matter what the proposal, there will be no majority opposition (self-support, the other person is opposed to not constitute a majority of objections). So level 2 pirates will propose 100, 0 of the distribution scheme, their own exclusive access to all gold coins.
After guessing the distribution scheme of Level 2 pirates, the level 3 pirates would propose a 99,0,1 allocation scheme. Class 1 Pirates will support the 3-class pirate scheme because they have more gold than the 2-level pirate scheme.
After guessing the distribution scheme of Level 3 pirates, the level 4 pirates would propose a 99,0,1,0 allocation scheme. So the Level 2 pirates get more gold than the 3-level pirate scheme, so they will support the 4-class pirate scheme.
After guessing the distribution scheme of Level 4 pirates, the level 5 pirates would propose a 98,0,1,0,1 allocation scheme. This way, Class 1 Pirates and Class 3 pirates get more gold than the 4-level pirate scheme, so they will support the scheme of the Class 5 pirates.

The issue of pirates ' separation of gold