1. Interaction Generation Adaptation
In the case of interaction, we determine the matrix based on the relationship of each other, so as to determine the strategy, but unfortunately, we human decision-making can be rational analysis, and biological decision-making only by virtue of the genetic characteristics of genes.
2. Evolutionary stability Strategy
Since it is difficult to consider what the dominant strategy is from an individual perspective, it is calculated that the group is relatively more stable by calculating the income.
We have found that even if a group is more stable and more efficient in the process of reproduction, it comes to a group that has relatively less advantage in survival, but because of its dominance in the struggle, it can achieve higher stability.
In short, a group, although the efficiency of resource utilization is not very high, but because in the struggle to occupy an advantage, so there is a relative survival advantage.
3. General strategies for evolutionary stability
If I was a big group, and suddenly came a handful of different, I can play on their own can also fight with them. The odds of playing on your own are higher, but occasionally there is a struggle. If the benefits of their struggle are not as high as our own, then the struggle will not survive. If the proceeds of the struggle are equal to our original subsistence income, then the profit of the struggle will determine whether it is stable.
In short, if there were a handful of alternatives, I would have lived better than him, so stable, because at first they faced a lot of competition and took a step back, and even though his struggles gained the same benefits, as long as I gained in the struggle relative to what they had gained, it was still stable. Because in these cases, the average number of things I get from each individual is still more.
4. The relationship between evolutionary stability and Nash equilibrium
The evolutionary stability strategy set S is a self that satisfies Nash equilibrium (s,s).
if (s,s) is a strict Nash equilibrium, then S is evolutionary stable.
2015.8.7 Evolutionary game theory