In the late the mid 1980s, when Huawei started its business, at that time, more than 400 communication manufacturing enterprises were born in China, so it was doomed that the industry must be a death race, and the winner must be the one who died the most late. But now, Huawei is alive to the end. Why Huawei can live to the end? Yes This is a "weird" business. A few years ago, when Huawei first entered the world's top 500, a company executive entered the conference room early in the morning, and he said, "I'm telling you the bad news is that the company has entered the world's top 500."
The "Ling" of the Oriental Ghosts.
After announcing the news, no one had a sense of pleasure, and no one was advocating any celebration.
In 2012, Huawei's annual sales amounted to an astonishing 220.2 billion trillion yuan, when Huawei overtook Ericsson as the world's largest telecoms equipment supplier.
In the same year, Huawei announced that Huawei's profits had broken 15.4 billion yuan (not including the 12.5 billion-dollar red envelopes used to give employees bonuses). And also in this year, Huawei's research and development costs even up to 29.9 billion yuan, equivalent to the annual output value of many of China's top companies.
This is China's best quality of a private enterprise, not one.
If you look at the data alone, founded more than 25 years, Huawei from 6 employees to 150,000 employees (including more than 30,000 foreign employees), from 20,000 Yuan venture to sales 220.2 billion yuan, as a no background, no resources, lack of capital of private enterprises, Huawei will be a large number of Western century giants have chopped off. It is regarded by many multinational rivals as "The Phantom of the Orient".
In fact, in the late the mid 1980s, when Huawei started its business, more than 400 communications manufacturing enterprises were born in the country, but the industry was destined to be a death race, and the winner must be the one who died late. Huawei lived to the end.
Why does Huawei live to the end? The background theory, the relationship theory and so on have come out, is this it? Why is Huawei not listed, why not the interview?
Ren, who graduated from Chongqing Construction Engineering College in 1968, joined the army. When he was 45 years old, he was a layman in communications, and 25 years later, with a 1.42% per cent stake in a 150,000-person business, breaking the cruelest law of the global IT industry, Huawei has a doorway.
In a sense, Huawei is the test ground of any positive and non management thought. The military-born Ren likes to talk about the Battle of Shangganlin: The U.S. military used computer simulations, that can be in a day to take positions, but later the results of the U.S. military surprised.
The reason is that the computer can only simulate conventional things, it is impossible to simulate someone will go to plug the machine gun eye, someone on fire will not move, this is the power of the spirit. Ren believes that the core value of an enterprise is "Ling", "Ling" may not directly produce "food", but once the enterprise lost the "Ling", will never produce "food".
The observation of Huawei should begin. "But know that you may not be able to reach the height of Huawei, but the direction must go right." ”
First scene: Bantian detail--a fragment observation from Huawei Base
Clearly, this is a close look at Huawei's opportunity.
One day in June 2013, our correspondent rushed to Huawei's Bantian base in Shenzhen, a modern base of nearly two square kilometres, which was built in 1997. It is said to have been a shock to the foreign customers who came to visit, "because many people could easily associate it with ' telecoms sweatshops ' before they came to Huawei." ”
From the garden of Paraquat to Huawei University
The day of the arrival of Huawei, this newspaper reporter to stay in the Paraquat Park, in fact, Bantian base of the large staff dormitory area. A European-style small building arranged neatly, the corridor in the wallpaper some have been pan old, and some are just paved with new paper. The rooms here are separate and small but the facilities are very large. Because of the mosquitoes in South China summer night, the room is equipped with electric mosquito-repellent incense.
In the case of Paraquat, the majority of single employees, in Huawei, many grassroots staff can apply for free. But the garden, after all, is limited in size, and in its own street is dubbed by Huawei employees as "village" in the building, there are also a lot of tenants from Huawei. However, this so-called village, perhaps should be counted as the highest level of Chinese culture, a "village".
Today, most of Huawei's 150,000 employees are undergraduate or above. However, no matter how high your degree, the position before the Huawei, you must participate in a "brigade training" course. For many of the people who attend the training, the place where they start and stay every day is the herb garden.
Huawei University is about 10 minutes away from the Paraquat park, only hardware will be invested billion, new employees pay training before the three months, and the company to report the berth tickets can be reimbursed. It is said that the training cycle is now shortened as the training system matures.
In fact, Huawei's uniqueness is embodied in the initial training course. After entering the University of Huawei, first of all to edit the class, teaching management team by instructors, class teacher, assistant class teacher, thought tutor composition. Instructors are responsible for discipline and military training, while ideological instructors are old experts who are mainly responsible for arranging courses and communicating with students.
In this completely closed, semi militarized training, cultural courses accounted for half, such as integrity, self-criticism, unity and cooperation, collective struggle, mutual assistance, responsibility and professionalism, obedience to organizational rules, customer-centric and so on; the rest is basic knowledge of the work, such as confidentiality, information security, quality, fire, office software, etc. Of course, the most important thing is about Huawei's status and communication expertise.
After graduating from the University of Huawei, the new employees will start to divert, some of them to Huawei in the domestic base, and some to overseas countries. In the same way, he also went to work in area A of Bantian.
A district is Huawei's administrative headquarters base and command hub, the environment chic elegant, first-class facilities, Huawei's boss Ren will be in A1 office.
The electronic screen of the exhibition hall
It is a huge electronic screen in front of the Huawei Company showroom in Bantian. The screen scrolls with the work of some of Huawei's employees.
Huawei employees all over the world, a touching picture in the video, appeared in the 2012 Japan Fudao earthquake. At the time, local residents had left Fudao because of a nuclear leak at the plant, while Huawei's employees in Japan had to go to Fudao to renovate communications equipment after wearing the anti-radiation gear.
In fact, war, natural disasters and other sad moments, is often the hard work of Huawei time, because this period of communication equipment often need to repair. As a private enterprise, Huawei has been able to surpass the European century rivals in 25 years, largely because of its devotion to the spirit of the struggling people.
Of course, pay and return in this business is proportional. "Don't let Lei Feng wear socks, don't let jiao tired out of liver disease." "In the high-speed operation of Huawei, the" high salary "line. According to Ren, Huawei is "high efficiency, high wages, high pressure" of the "three-high" enterprises, "higher wages is the first impetus."
Today, know "Huawei" the name of a lot of people, but wise up, believe that people outside the telecommunications industry, more than 90% are completely unaware of the High-tech enterprises of the specific business projects, Huawei is a lot of people do not know it to remember and spread the reason is very simple, is "a high-paying enterprise."
Ren in the enterprise to carry out the "workers have their shares" incentive mechanism, so that employees and enterprises to work together to benefit, formed an organic destiny community. For example, according to Huawei's 2010-year performance, each share dividend of 2.98 yuan, if an old employee holding 500,000 shares, he will receive dividends at the end of more than 1 million yuan.
This equity allocation within Huawei is called virtual restricted stocks, Ren's shares accounted for 1.42%, the remaining shares are held by the staff holding Committee. Employee elected representatives enter the board of directors and take control of the business direction.
At present, Huawei in the internal issue of Virtual Limited shares about 11 billion shares, each share value of about 5 yuan. This is the equivalent of an internal stock exchange, which over the years Huawei has raised even several times more money than some of its peers have raised in a domestic a-share. If the shareholders want to quit, Huawei is now taking the value of the enterprise model, the original equity and value-added part of the retreat to employees. This kind of retreat and ease of the way to obtain the approval of employees, but also for the development of enterprises to raise valuable funds, and the holding staff also in the rapid development of Huawei has won a substantial equity gains.
For example, from 2000 to 2010, the Shanghai Composite Index rose from 2,073 points to 2,808 points, increasing 0.35 times times. In the same period, if the investment in Shanghai's house, increased 5.4 times times. If you invest in Huawei's virtual restricted stocks, the value added will reach 15 times times.
Since Huawei is not a listed company, the key to this model must be to solve the problem of trust in the enterprise. Ren's solution is to invite Deloitte, one of the five major companies, to conduct financial audits of the company every year, including the cost of the dry cleaning of the hotel during his personal business trip, which should be paid by individuals, and the careless reimbursement of public funds will be corrected by the audit, which solves the problem of trust.
A driver's code of conduct
When we arrived in Shenzhen, Shenzhen was in high temperature, but the lad who came to pick up the machine was still in suits. This is a little surprising to us.
According to the Tong Hua of Chongqing Sheng, who has visited Huawei for several times, today's Huawei services, such as transport vehicles, have been outsourced, and if the company's internal standards have been followed in the past few years, guests have felt that Huawei's customer-centric business philosophy.
Drivers are all in a suit, the car spotless, to any customer, they open the door early, a hand on the car door, a hand on the roof along, said: Hello! Please be careful. "Don't drive fast, concentrate, don't slam on the brakes and throttle." Customers go to play, they wait silently in the car. When the customer first saw him, he must have opened the door, a hand on the car door, a hand on the roof along, said: "Hello!
To eat time, the customer finished, he will be punctual waiting at the door. When they have to eat with their customers in special situations, they quickly finish their meal and wait in the car.
In fact, many of the entrepreneurs to visit Huawei after visiting Huawei, are a bit of a monk, a see how many people and how many equipment enterprises, why can do more than 200 billion yuan of sales? More to their enlightenment, is a 2002-year annual conference video: Ren summoned more than 10,000 employees, suppliers, customers, etc. to attend the annual meeting , the staff's high morale is shocking, and even more shocking is that the whole activity process no one's cell phone rang, the toilet also did not find cigarette butts, which in general business is unimaginable.
Deep observation: The Logic of Huawei
To learn Huawei, Huawei is not replicable, because "current" is not replicable. But learning Huawei will undoubtedly benefit people, and its successful systematic logic, pioneering thinking and accurate grasp of the market, are worthy of in-depth study and experience.
Perspective one: Unmatched low cost advantage--comparison of Huawei's advantages and disadvantages with competitors at home and abroad
This is an era of rapid technological development, in which the electronic information (market area) industry is a highly knowledge-intensive, updated very fast high profit industry. Before the 90 's, install the telephone to the post office to 5000~6000 Yuan, the Post and Telecommunications Bureau with each telephone 2000 yuan price to switch manufacturers to purchase the switch (telephone equipment room used in the phone to renew the hub equipment, a device can be connected to hundreds of or tens of thousands of lines of telephone), and the cost of the switch is only 300 ~400 yuan/wire (a line is a telephone). The profits of the equipment manufacturers are very considerable. This is the profit logic of Huawei's initial venture.
Huawei 1988 to act as the agent of Hong Kong Hung-year company's program-controlled switchboard started, 1992 sales revenue exceeded 100 million yuan. 20 years later, Huawei sales growth of more than 2000 times to 220.2 billion yuan, to become one of the world's largest communications equipment manufacturers, 150,000 employees, research and development personnel 46%, in the world has 23 research institutes and 34 innovation centers, but also the world's only unlisted 500 strong enterprises.
Huawei's growth soared, domestic and foreign rivals have fallen. Why?
To analyze Huawei's growth logic, the first thing to look at is its competitors.
Domestic and foreign competitors in the 90 's, Huawei in the international market facing Ericsson, Alcatel, Siemens, Fujitsu, Lucent, Nortel and other international competitors, are strong technology and strong financial resources. Domestic competitors are the dragon, Datang, ZTE Three, and Huawei and said "huge China", but only the Huawei family is a purely private enterprise, the system brings competitive advantage.
Both of them are state-owned enterprises with state-owned research background, although the early 90 's hit, but in the fierce competition in the outcome of the failure can be imagined. ZTE is a mixed-ownership enterprise formed by state-owned enterprises and private capital, "state-run Private", and 2012 overseas and domestic revenue amounted to 84.2 billion yuan.
Domestic rivals are hard to rival Huawei, and only international rivals pose a threat to Huawei. In comparison, Huawei has a huge advantage, that is, cost advantage, and relatively recessive advantage.
Huawei's Low-cost research and development advantage Huawei's main competitive advantage is its very low cost of research and development--low-cost intellectual human resources. An internal report from the Siemens board of Directors in 2004 found that Huawei's low-cost advantage came mainly from low research and development costs.
According to this material (market area), the average per capita cost for Huawei developers is $25,000 a year, while European business developers spend about 120,000 ~15 million dollars a year, 6 times times that of Huawei, and Huawei's developers work about 2,750 hours a day, while European researchers work for an average of 1300. ~1400 hours (Sell-off 35 hours, but many holidays), the two per capita work input time ratio of 2:1.
According to 2004 data, Huawei has 13,000 software and hardware developers. If the cost of employing 13,000 European developers is invested in Huawei, Huawei can hire 78000 people.
If the efficiency of Huawei's developers is only 80% of those of European researchers, and given the time invested by Huawei's employees, it can be calculated that, under the same cost, Huawei in 2004 is equivalent to the research and development capability of 125,000 78000x0.8x2 of similar companies in the west. Research and development input and output than near most Western companies 10 times times!
Or, Huawei invested 1 yuan in the development of things, European companies need to invest 10 yuan to do it.
This is the beginning of Huawei has, and has continued to this day to the big core advantage of small beats.
A small case on the basis of the same technology, Cheap is the king. The first of Huawei's customer strategy is: "Not to sell the most expensive, only sell the best, not only low price, better quality." "Huawei invests money in product technology research and development, but the product price is not expensive, only maintain a reasonable profit margin." So how far is Huawei's cost-leading strategy leading?
Huawei has been using the Low-cost strategy, the classic case from the 2008 China Telecom CDMA bidding.
August 2008, China Telecom nearly 30 billion of the CDMA large single trigger equipment manufacturers a new round of bidding for battle. Rung (France Alcatel, the United States Lang two international giants under the global impact of Huawei had to be merged), the Canadian Nortel and domestic ZTE's offer in 7 billion Yuan ~140 billion, Huawei has reported to let all people surprised the ultra low price, 700 million yuan! This price, by the industry called "Naked Ben." Yet even at such low prices, Huawei's profits are still impressive.
No one doubts Huawei's investment and strength in research, development, cost and overall solutions. This shows that the telecommunications equipment industry as a whole high rate of return, and Huawei cost leadership strategy is strong.
Someone once asked why Huawei was successful? Two executives who have worked for 9 years in Huawei have made a very interesting statement, one said: "Because we circled a fertile land." The other one describes the image: "The electronic communications industry is a deep water, only deep water can raise large fish." "The fertile field means high profits, and deep water means huge market space."
Other cost advantages Huawei's other major cost advantage is embodied in raw materials. In the 90 's, Huawei spent a relatively low cost on raw materials, through good long-term cooperation with upstream suppliers of raw materials, and lower domestic resource prices than in general. Huawei's material costs have fallen to 3%, with obvious advantages, under the scale-economy effect of millions of devices sold annually.
Moreover, Huawei's domestic transaction/delivery costs were relatively low, the quality cost is very low compared with foreign countries, the efficiency is not the most sensitive factor, many can make up by the interpersonal relationship factor; Also, China has not been a system of intellectual property business rules, which becomes the lowest cost of domestic "transaction", in addition, The domestic service cost is low, also became the advantage.
Through analysis and comparison, we can see that Huawei has a series of inherent low-cost advantages in this industry. Under these preconditions, what kind of business strategy does it need to take to achieve today's success?
The second point of view: "Benefit community" to transform the decay into magic--how technology owners and market owners realize 1+1>2
There is a small story that can become an alternative annotation of Huawei. At the beginning of 1993, in a small auditorium of Shekou in Shenzhen, Huawei held a 1992-year year-end summary meeting, when all staff 270 people, for the first time witnessed the heavy face of Ren, the voice of the vicissitudes of the truth revealed. After the meeting began, I saw Ren on the stage said "We survived", the tears can not be said to go on, hands constantly wiping tears ...
This is a mirror. From this we can see the hardships and humiliation that Ren had endured in his early years, and how determined he was when he adopted the strategy of total win market and full shareholding. Would rather with all equally, would rather own only 1.42% of the shares, but also let the partners, let the staff and their own desperately to big business.
Capital and market exams at this point, Huawei already has a prominent cost advantage, but it also needs market size.
There is no strong financial strength, the cost advantage is again obvious, it is difficult to enlarge the market, then the cost advantage of economies of scale is not reflected, Huawei is tantamount to no advantage. The key is money, but 1992 Huawei sales revenue is only 100 million yuan, this money is far from enough to do the market. What's more, research and development is a long process that costs a lot of money to recruit a large number of technicians and to invest heavily in it. At this time Huawei funds extremely nervous, facing the death test.
Where's the money?
In the early 90, foreign rivals were entering the Chinese market through technology transfer, postal systems and even joint ventures with local governments. He thought, since foreign capital can do so, own core technology, why not? Huawei soon learned this and did it more thoroughly – Huawei is not just a joint venture with a local postal and telecommunications system, but a joint venture with the country's postal and telecommunications system to absorb shares extensively.
What is more, Huawei does not absorb simple funds that only give financial support but does not have business dealings, but instead concentrates the goal of venture capital on the customer base, which has both the market and the capital, namely the postal system. That is, the post and telecommunications system to cooperate with Huawei to form a new company, Huawei shares and led the operation. This is 1993 years to receive Guangdong Province and Shenzhen support, Huawei and the country's 21 provincial capital city posts and telecommunications system jointly launched the joint venture-Mobeck company, registered capital of 88.81 million yuan. Huawei's annual dividend commitment to postal and telecommunications shareholders amounted to 30%.
For the postal system, this is to use their own funds in the market to do their own. Make yourself profitable, and naturally do your best.
In this way, Huawei and the telecommunications customers formed a close alliance between the capital and the market, like the two sides of the coin, one side to get the money on the other side of the market. The capital has been solved, the market has opened, Huawei has made a big transition and passed the life and death pass.
A stone number of birds Huawei's switch through the Mobeck channel rapidly low-cost impact on the national market, by 1995, forcing the switch industry sales price from the 200~300 dollar/Line down to 80 U.S. dollars/lines, the postal system also because of the whole industry switch purchase price significantly lower and realize the telecommunications business to the national rapid promotion. Finally realize the whole society, consumers, posts and telecommunications systems and Huawei win.
The "stakeholder" model was immediate, with Huawei's revenues rising from 100 million yuan in 1992 to 2.6 billion yuan in 1996 years. This year to complete the mission of the Mobeck independent sales Huawei Power products, and then to Shenzhen Electric Co., Ltd., 2001 to 30 times times the price-earnings ratio, calculated 6 billion yuan sold to Emerson, "far beyond the number of listed companies financing," Huawei once again has a large amount of money. The shareholders of that year also received a high return on investment.
So far, we can see that the market logic of Huawei is very clear, that is to create a "community of interests", rich people earn. "Modern enterprise competition is not a competition between individual enterprises, but supply chain competition," Ren said. Enterprise's supply chain is an ecological chain, customers, collaborators, suppliers, manufacturers fate in a ship. Only by strengthening cooperation, paying attention to the interests of customers, partners, and the pursuit of more win, enterprises can live long. The idea of "benefit community" is directly reflected in the whole stock holding.
In 1994, Huawei once again set up 27 joint ventures with the provincial post and post offices to further open up the market channels, total access to "venture capital" 540 million yuan, once again for Huawei's high-speed expansion and large-scale research and development of the input of blood.
Two times the establishment of such a series of companies, is a stone number of birds. Not only did it get the money to boost Huawei's sales, but it also dredged up long-term customer relationships, and, more to the point, solved the problem of a headache for all communications manufacturers and a return to cash flow problems-making it a great idea for a joint venture to receive a client's account as a shareholder. Moreover, such a bundle of interests could have a subtle effect on the corporate crisis. It could be a suspicion-related deal, which, after 2000 years, exits as Huawei's divisions. What is important is that they have completed their historic mission and helped Huawei overcome its key rivals during the critical period.
"There is an interest-and-mass-driven mechanism, and we can activate the organization." "said Ren.
This stakeholder in the value chain of customers, suppliers, partners, competitors, together with "pull down", forming "You have me, I have you," the "won-win eco-circle" thinking, eventually made Huawei's market rapid and large scale, its low-cost advantage eventually to a large-scale explosion--the early years to maintain 100% About the growth of 2003 sales revenue of 31.7 billion yuan, gross margin reached an alarming 53%. This year, Haier, Lenovo, Tcl in China's electronic information enterprises ranked in the top three turnover, but the total profit of the three companies is about equal to Huawei one.
To the magic of the logic can be inferred, Huawei lack of money, Ren will not first think of looking for the bank (market area), he first thought of how to make his own this demand for a partnership with the stakeholders to win a winning opportunity. If you find a bank loan, we need Huawei to bear the risk of the market and repayment, and the partners do not have the motivation to take more enthusiasm to do the market to make the whole value chain more value-added, so lonely Huawei's commitment to the risk is huge, and not conducive to the market bigger.
The practice of Ren is, to find stakeholders to set up a joint venture, on the one hand to achieve financing, on the other hand, Huawei's financing risk spread to the entire value chain, another, "equally" will strongly stimulate the partner struggle, so that value chain will not only eliminate the value-added in the entire value chain of the financing risk, Huawei can also easily enlarge its market and further strengthen its customer relationship. The benefits of financing the banks are simply not in the same way. The difficulty and risk of the elimination of the intangible, is already good enough, and Ren more clever is that he will be difficult and risk into "Taurus."
This is the logic of Ren.
The third point of view: High profit is a pass: the extreme motivation-how Huawei manages and inspires human capabilities
High profits have brought new business thinking to Huawei. At this point, Ren, who has a lot of cash, began a deeper business strategy: to make all the corporate advantages of high profits, to inspire all the enthusiasm of employees, to "snowball" the way to achieve acceleration and a larger scale of development-
① implement full salary, stimulate the staff potential;
② implement full shareholding, forming the enterprise internal "full benefit community";
③ large-scale investment research and development, the annual maintenance of more than 10% of the revenue or even far more than this number;
④ a large number of recruiting high level of research and development personnel, to promote independent research and development;
⑤ a large number of recruitment of market front-line personnel, to the global market full attack.
It is important to emphasize that Ren's practices are so open and offensive that it is entirely based on the enormous space of the Electronic Communications Market (2009 National fixed telephone reached 310 million, 2013 mobile phone households reached 1.146 billion), the product of high-speed replacement and high profit characteristics. In Ren's view, the electronic communications industry is completely a rush of the market, the industry every enterprise has become a Big Mac, it depends on whether you have enough bold measures and play to the end of the determination.
Full high salaries In fact, Huawei started in the implementation of full pay system, but now Huawei more daring to do so. At the beginning of 1993, as a software engineer into the Huawei before Liu Ping, as a teacher in Shanghai Jiaotong University, in the school's wages more than 400 yuan one months, this is still work eight years of postgraduate treatment. Came to Huawei, the February salary is 1500 yuan, than at the time of the president of Shanghai Jiaotong University, and his salary is still high, and he February only on a day of classes, the result was half a month's wages! This let Liu Ping big accident, deeply moved. The second month rose to 2600 yuan, after which, Liu Ping was excited that every month wages will rise, at the end of 1993 his salary has risen to 6000 yuan. This year his annual salary is 48,000 yuan (equivalent to 2009 purchasing power is roughly equal to 480,000 yuan annual salary). Huawei is doing this because he believes companies can buy components at high prices, buy machines at high prices, and pay high salaries to buy talent.
Later in the "Huawei Basic Law" there is such a phrase "Huawei to ensure that in the economic boom period and the stage of good development, staff per capita income is higher than the corresponding highest level of regional industry." ”
Another estimated that 2007 Huawei's most basic staff's annual salary of 160,000 yuan, the average manager level of 500,000 yuan, the company's senior executives are as high as tens of millions of yuan, far higher than other domestic enterprises of the annual income level.
Full shareholding in the initial period of start-up, as a private enterprise, financing difficulties. In order to attract talent, Ren diluted his own shares, which is Huawei's full shareholding.
According to Huawei's internal stock system and operating situation, if a potential staff in 1997 into the Huawei, 1998, the 1997 year year-end bonus 40,000 yuan, will be 80,000 Yuan shares; 1999, 80,000 yuan share dividends 60%, at the same time receive the bonus of 1998 80,000 Yuan, But it will share 180,000 yuan in the stock. When he worked in Huawei for three years, he had 260,000 yuan of Huawei stock, of course, these stocks need to use cash to buy, the separation of a certain percentage of cash. Moreover, the company allocates the internal stock of the talented person, do not buy not yet, do not buy means and company is not stick, will affect next promotion, raise.
Huawei's internal stock dividend ratio, 1992-1996 years are as high as 100%, 1997 is 70%, then decline to 2002 20%, a year to send a dividend, the dividend automatically rolled into the principal. In the past, Huawei has a "1+1+1" that the income of employees, wages, bonuses, share dividend income ratio is equal.
Once Huawei stops growing or shuts down, its employees will suffer heavy losses, so Huawei can unite, flourish, and execute in a particularly strong capacity. Because employees are working for themselves. At the same time, a large number of employees have tasted the proportion of high dividends every year to find ways to earn more shares, the only way is to create more value for the company.
Ren himself accounts for only 1.42% of Huawei's shares and the rest is owned by executives and employees. Currently, 70,000 of Huawei's 150,000 employees have shares in Huawei. Because of the high salary and the stock, gives the staff the huge treatment, in Huawei's core value, this is "strives for the person as the basis".
Why is Huawei not listed? Huawei is not listed, which can be explained here. First, equity is too fragmented. In accordance with the relevant laws and regulations, the number of unlisted company shareholders shall not exceed 200 persons, and Huawei has more than 70,000 shareholders; second, Ren's share of the shares is too small, after the listing will certainly lose control of the company, and Huawei is inseparable from Ren; third, if Huawei is listed, it will produce tens of thousands of millions or billionaires, Can the eagle that is tied with gold still soar in the sky? The listing of wealth and Huawei "long-term hard struggle" core values, completely opposite. Why does the famous international telecoms giant, the Canadian Nortel, decline so quickly? It is because a large crowd of billionaires to discuss the survival of the company, scattered lightly without a sense of urgency. So Nortel missed many times the opportunity to save themselves; The short-term financial indicators required by shareholders for the quarterly reports of listed companies contradict Huawei's "10-year plan for the future" market operation model (which is an important reason for Huawei to beat many international giants); Even if Huawei is short of money, it will throw the opportunity on the partner in the value chain.
Perspective four: High profit is a copy of the card: competition to the bottom--based on the cost and customer relationship of Huawei competition law
All of Huawei's business practices revolve around "high profits". How much profit does it have? It's almost a trace. The only thing we see is that it always has a surprisingly low price--it's a direct challenge to the industry's game rules. It also directly according to their own play, will be the two kinds of Huawei has been given new ideas of the old business competition model to sink, sinking to the end, sank to no longer, and then go to prison sit real, and then neat, beat opponents, down-to-earth money.
Two kinds of the old business model that Huawei achieves the acme of originality, one is ultra low price, one is the core value "take customer as center" under "do not tie ties".
Long-term pricing rules This is exactly the same as the market strategy for the microwave ovens of that year, which creates a high threshold at ultra-low prices. Before the rise of Huawei and ZTE, Telecom is a technology-driven industry, enterprises invest heavily in research and development of new products, and then set high prices, to earn large profits, recycling research and development costs, and then put into the development of new products; when the product volume production, following the large number of entrants, began to reduce prices, product life cycle quickly into the Earn a high profit ... Cycle, form virtuous circle. Huawei likens this business model to Wang selling tofu. Wang opened a tofu shop, selling two yuan a catty, someone saw profitable, opened the second tofu shop, Wang began to reduce the price to a piece of five, three, four ... Tofu Shop more open, the price drops to 8 cents, Wang Tofu shop closed.
Huawei does not do Wang, and it pushes its international rivals to the Wang position.
After the bursting of the global it bubble in 2000, Huawei was acutely aware that the telecoms industry had shifted from technology-driven to customer demand, as technology had grown far beyond current customer demand, and new technology was proving increasingly difficult to market.
Huawei is positioning itself as a mass production type.