Huang a mention of the gem delisting system, we hear is a mouthful of "the most strict" or "more strict." Seems to have left this "Yan" word, gem delisting system on the table, without an account. This actually makes the gem delisting system from the beginning into a trap. In fact, in the overseas gem market, delisting is a very common and normal market behavior, its return rate is significantly higher than the motherboard market. Most of the delisting systems are consistent with the listing criteria. Moreover, in addition to the listing conditions and the corresponding quantitative criteria, often more depending on the stock price, turnover and other market performance directly related to the quantitative factors of the performance, thus more reflect the market-oriented concept of retreat. This has the characteristics of the gem delisting system, so that the market for gem listed companies can be said to be commonplace. A delisting system, its basic requirements should be appropriate, rather than what is "the most strict" or "stricter." This is especially true of gem. "Company law", "securities law" for the withdrawal of the city has expressly, is not in line with the listing conditions of listed companies must return to the market. However, from the previous a-share board market situation, under the control of various interest relations, the information disclosure and the imperfect corporate governance mechanism have delayed the screening of poor management companies, enhanced the impact on the market and increased the cost of delisting, thus further delaying the implementation of the delisting. In other words, the system of the motherboard delisting mechanism, the main crux of the problem is that the retreat, which is more a matter of executive power. Our GEM listing standards began to consider too low threshold, but later in the implementation of inadvertently "turn" into a high threshold. Now it seems that the "most strict delisting system" of China's gem has become the most difficult to implement the "delisting system", but also with the GEM listing standards such a self-inflicted trap inseparable. At present, the overall performance growth of the gem is not only lower than the board, but also behind the motherboard, and those known as the gem "quasi-delisting company" performance-changing companies, the performance changes at least more than 20%, more or even more than 80%. Such a serious "face" situation, not to return to the city is not justified, and if a "face" to a "chop Lijue" type of retreat, then, cashing run on the vested interests will be ecstatic, and the investors in the interest of how to get a reasonable protection? We know that the gem in the creation of the 400多位亿万 rich, but also to cover nearly 70% of investors, brought them a serious loss. This not only highlights the "heavy financing light return" of the new issue pricing mechanism defects, but also with the gem is different from the motherboard or small plate of a unique inherent risk mechanism inseparable. To meet the needs of the venture capital is the proper meaning of the problem, which is not exactly the same as the "Securities law" stipulated in the "Company law" is not in conformity with the listing conditions. In the case that the securities law has not been amended, how the delisting system of the gem is to be used between the law and the market is clearly not only a general "buyer's ego"The risk consciousness, but also needs to have one kind not to violate the most basic supervisory idea while simultaneously takes into account the market actual need the innovation courage." The author believes that the gem delisting system or the surname "Chuang". That is to say, the gem listed companies not only in the case of the listing conditions should apply for delisting, no longer have the original expected sustainable operating conditions, it is difficult to continue to bear the cost of maintaining the listing, can not meet the market price and turnover of the minimum requirements, can also apply for delisting. Moreover, in the wind investment has a strong exit requirements, the enterprise exists the objective need of reorganization and merger, or enterprise maturity is not suitable to stay in the gem, need to go to the motherboard or other market to seek broader development space, should also be able to apply for delisting. Listed companies may reasonably choose different exit channels and exit modes, including transfer to Sanbanxi market. Here, the need for strict laws and regulations to limit the restrictions, not the so-called most stringent delisting standards, but more stringent information disclosure system, more equitable investor protection measures, and more reasonable and feasible compensation mechanism. Only in this way, can more and better reflect the cost of listing and the consistency of the cost of delisting, more and better reflect the requirements of delisting standards for performance and market value, more and better compatible with listed companies and the interests of various investors, including VCs. Therefore, the author thinks that under the current conditions, the release of the risk of the gem, should be sparse and not blocked. In order to avoid the so-called "most strict" delisting system in the same time, more harm to the listed companies, but also hurt the investment and the vast majority of investors, we must quickly out of the gem delisting system surname "strict" misunderstanding. (the author is a senior market observer)
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